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ABSTRACT
We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database of 1569
sub-national regions from 110 countries covering 74 percent of the world’s surface and 96 percent
of its GDP. We combine the cross-regional analysis of geographic, institutional, cultural, and human
capital determinants of regional development with an examination of productivity in several thousand
establishments located in these regions. To organize the discussion, we present a new model of regional
development that introduces into a standard migration framework elements of both the Lucas (1978)
model of the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work, and the Lucas (1988) model
of human capital externalities. The evidence points to the paramount importance of human capital
in accounting for regional differences in development, but also suggests from model estimation and
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I.   Introduction. 
 
We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database 
of 1569 sub-national regions from 110 countries covering 74 percent of the world’s surface and 96 
percent of its GDP.   We consider a variety of fundamental determinants of economic development, 
such as geography, natural resource endowments, institutions, human capital, and culture, by looking 
within countries.  We combine this analysis with an examination of labor productivity and wages in 
several thousand establishments covered by the World Bank Enterprise Survey, for which we have both 
establishment-specific  and  regional  data.      Throughout  the  analysis,  human capital  measured  using 
education  emerges  as  the  most  consistently  important  determinant  of  both  regional  income  and 
productivity of regional establishments.   The combination of regional and establishment-level data 
enables us to investigate some of the key channels through which human capital operates, including 
education of workers, education of entrepreneurs/managers, and externalities.  
To organize this discussion, we present a new model describing the channels through which 
human capital influences productivity, which combines three features.  First, human capital of workers 
enters  as  an  input  into  the  neoclassical  production  function,  but  human  capital  of  the 
entrepreneur/manager  influences  firm-level  productivity  independently.    The  distinction  between 
entrepreneurs/managers  and  workers  has  been  shown  empirically  to  be  critical  in  accounting  for 
productivity and size of firms in developing countries (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007, 2010; La Porta and 
Shleifer 2008; Syverson 2011).  In the models of allocation of talent between work and entrepreneurship 
such  as  Lucas  (1978),  Baumol  (1990),  and  Murphy,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1991),  returns  to 
entrepreneurial schooling may appear as profits rather than wages.  By modeling this allocation, we 
trace these two separate contributions of human capital to productivity.  
Second, our approach allows for human capital externalities, emphasized in the regional context 
by  Jacobs  (1969),  and  in  the  growth  context  by  Lucas  (1988,  2008)  and  Romer  (1990).    These 3 
 
externalities result from people in a given location spontaneously interacting with and learning from 
each other, so knowledge is transmitted across people without being paid for.  Because our framework 
incorporates both the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work as in Lucas (1978), and 
human capital externalities as in Lucas (1988), we call it the Lucas-Lucas model
2.    Human capital 
externalities have been found in a variety of development and regional contexts (Rauch 1993, Glaeser, 
Scheinkman and Shleifer 1995,  Angrist and Acemoglu 2000,  Glaeser and Mare 2001, Moretti 2004, 
Iranzo and Peri 2009), although Ciccone and Peri (2006) and Caselli (2005) find them to be unimportant.    
By  decomposing  human  capital  effects  into  those  of  worker  education,  entrepreneurial/managerial 
education, and externalities using a unified framework, we try to disentangle different mechanisms.      
Third, because we are looking at the regions, we need to consider the mobility of firms, workers, 
and entrepreneurs across regions, which is presumably less expensive than that across countries.   To 
this end, our model follows the standard urban economics approach (e.g., Roback 1982, Glaeser and 
Gottlieb 2009) of labor mobility across regions with scarce resources, such as land and housing, limiting 
universal migration into the most productive regions. This aspect of the model allows us to consider 
jointly the education coefficients in regional and establishment level regressions.   A key benefit of our 
model of the three channels of influence of education is to reconcile regional and firm-level evidence.    
To  begin,  we  use  regional  data  to  examine  the  determinants  of  regional  income  in  a 
specification with country fixed effects.   Our approach follows development accounting, as in Hall and 
Jones  (1999),  Caselli  (2005),  and  Hsieh  and  Klenow  (2010).    Among  the  determinants  of  regional 
productivity,  we  consider  geography,  as  measured  by  temperature  (Dell,  Jones,  and  Olken  2009), 
distance to the ocean (Bloom and Sachs 1998), and natural resources endowments.   We also consider 
                                                           
2 We do not consider the role of human capital in shaping the adoption of new technologies.  Starting with Nelson 
and Phelps (1966), economists have argued that human capital accelerates the adoption of new technologies.  For 
recent models of these effects, see Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005), and Caselli 
and Coleman (2006).  For evidence on such externalities and R&D spillovers, see Coe and Helpman (1995), Ciccone 
and Papaioannou (2009), and Wolff (2011). 4 
 
institutions, which have been found by King and Levine (1993), De Long and Shleifer (1993), Hall and 
Jones (1999), and Acemoglu et al. (2001) to be significant determinants of development.    We also look 
at culture, measured by trust (Knack and Keefer 1997) and at ethnic heterogeneity (Easterly and Levine 
1997, Alesina et al. 2003).   Last, we consider the effect of average education in a region on its level of 
development.   A substantial cross-country literature points to a large role of education.  Barro (1991) 
and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) are two early empirical studies; de La Fuente and Domenech 
(2006) and Cohen and Soto (2007) are recent confirmations.   Across countries, the effects of education 
and institutions are difficult to disentangle empirically because both are endogenous and because the 
potential instruments for each are correlated with both (Glaeser et al 2004).   By using country fixed 
effects, we can avoid identification problems caused by unobserved country-specific factors.  
  We find that favorable geography, such as lower average temperature and proximity to the 
ocean, as well as higher natural resource endowments, are associated with higher per capita income in 
regions within countries.  We do not find that culture, as measured by ethnic heterogeneity or trust, 
explains regional differences.   Nor do we find that institutions as measured by survey assessments of 
the business environment in the Enterprise Surveys help account for cross-regional differences within a 
country.  Some institutions or culture may matter only at the national level, but then large income 
differences  within  countries  call  for  explanations  other  than  culture  and  institutions.    In  contrast, 
differences  in  educational  attainment  account  for  a  large  share  of  the  regional  income  differences 
within a country.   The within country R
2 in the univariate regression of the log of per capita income on 
the log of education is about 25 percent; this R
2 is not higher than 8 percent for any other variable.  
Acemoglu  and  Dell  (2010)  examine  sub-national  data  from  North  and  South  America  to 
disentangle the roles of education and institutions in accounting for development.  The authors find that 
about half of the within-country variation in levels of income is accounted for by education.  This is 
similar to the Mankiw et al. (1992) estimate that half of the differences in per capita incomes across 5 
 
countries is attributable to education.   We confirm a large role of education, but try to go further in 
identifying the channels.   Acemoglu and Dell also conjecture that institutions shape the remainder of 
the local income differences.  We have regional data on several aspects of institutional quality, but find 
that their ability to explain cross-regional differences is minimal
3. 
  Regional regressions  have the problem that  human capital in a region  may be endogenous 
because of migration.  To make progress on this front, we next examine the determinants of firm-level 
productivity.  To  this  end,  we  merge  our  data  with  World  Bank  Enterprise  Surveys,  which  provide 
establishment-level information on sales, labor force, educational level of management and employees, 
as well as energy and capital use for several thousand establishments in the regions for which we have 
data.  The micro data show that establishments with employees and managers with more education are 
more productive, holding capital and energy inputs constant and including regionXindustry fixed effects.  
These data point to a large role of managerial/entrepreneurial human capital in raising firm productivity.   
We then re-estimate the same equations including regional education, but replacing regionXindustry 
fixed effects with country and industry fixed effects.  In these regressions, regional education has a large 
and positive coefficient, pointing to sizeable human capital externalities that survive controls for several 
potential  determinants  of  regional  productivity.    However,  because  regional  education  may  be 
correlated  with  unobserved  region-specific  productivity  parameters,  we  do  not  have  perfect 
identification in this analysis of externalities.   
To assess the extent to which firm-level results can account for the role of human capital across 
regions, we combine estimation with calibration. To circumvent the endogeneity problems entailed in 
cross country regressions, scholars have turned to calibration techniques, using micro studies to pin 
                                                           
3  A  recent  literature  looks  at  colonial  history  within  countries,  and  argues  that  regions  that  were  treated 
particularly badly by colonizers have poor institutions and lower income many years later (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, 
Dell 2010).  It is surely possible, even likely, that severe institutional shocks have long run consequences because 
they influence human capital accumulation and institutions in the long run.  But to the extent that we have 
adequate measures of institutional quality, the consequences of such shocks for modern institutions do not appear 
to add a great deal of explanatory power to understanding cross-regional evidence today.   6 
 
down the parameters of the production function (e.g., Caselli 2005).  We also rely on previous research 
regarding factor shares (e.g., Gollin 2002, Caselli and Feyer 2007, Valentinyi and Herrendorf 2008), but 
then combine it with coefficient estimates from regional and firm-level regressions.  This allows us to 
back out the returns to schooling and the role of externalities.  We find substantial consistency between 
regional  and  firm-level  results,  as  well  as  plausible  estimates  of  the  parameters  of  the  production 
function.  Our calibrations show that worker education, entrepreneurial education, and externalities all 
substantially contribute to productivity.  We find the role of workers’ human capital to be in line with 
standard wage regressions, which are the benchmark adopted by conventional calibration studies (e.g. 
Caselli  2005).  Crucially,  however,  our  results  indicate  that  focusing  on  worker  education  alone 
substantially underestimates both private and social returns to education. Private returns are very high 
but to a substantial extent are earned by entrepreneurs, and hence might appear as profits rather than 
wages, consistent with Lucas (1978).  Although we have less confidence in the findings for externalities, 
our best estimates suggest that those are also sizeable and fall in the ballpark of existing estimates (e.g. 
Moretti 2004).  In sum, the evidence points to a large influence of entrepreneurial human capital, and 
perhaps of human capital externalities, on productivity.   
  In section II, we present a model of regional development that organizes the evidence.  In 
section III, we describe our data.  Section IV examines the determinants of both national and regional 
development.  Section V presents firm-level evidence to disentangle the channels of through which 
human capital influences productivity.  We combine the regional and the micro estimates to compute 
the model’s parameters and to assess its ability to explain income differences.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II.  A Lucas-Lucas spatial model of regional and national income 
A country consists of a measure 1 of regions, a share p of which has productivity   ̃  and a share 
1– p of which has productivity   ̃      ̃ .  We refer to the former regions as “productive”, to the latter 7 
 
regions as “unproductive”, and denote them by i = G, B.  A measure 2 of agents is uniformly distributed 
across regions.  An agent j enjoys consumption and housing according to the utility function: 
j ja c a c u
   
1 ) , ( ,                                                                         (1) 
where c  and  a  denote  consumption and  housing,  respectively.    Half the  agents  are “rentiers,”  the 
remaining half are “labourers’’.  Each rentier owns 1 unit of housing, T units of land, K units of physical 
capital (and no human capital).  Each labourer is endowed with hR++ units of human capital. In region i 
= G, B the distribution of human capital is Pareto in [h,+∞), with mean μih/(μi–1), where μi, h>1.  We 
denote by Hi = μih/(μ–1) the initial human capital endowment of region  i = G, B. Differences in Hi 
capture exogenous variation of human capital across regions.  
A  labourer  can  become  either  an  entrepreneur  or  a  worker.    By  operating  in  region  i,  an 
entrepreneur with human capital h who hires physical capital Ki,h, land Ti,h, and workers with total 
human capital Hi,h  produces an amount of the consumption good equal to: 
     
h i h i h i i h i T K H h A y , , ,
1
,
    ,   1       .                    (2) 
As in Lucas (1978), a firm’s output increases, at a diminishing rate, in the entrepreneur’s human capital 
has well as in Hi,h, Ki,h and Ti,h.  We model human capital externalities (Lucas 1988) by assuming that 
regional total factor productivity is given by: 
 
 
i i i i L h E A A ) (
~
 ,      γ> 0, ψ ≥ 1.                                                 (3) 
According to (3), holding region-specific factors   ̃  constant (e.g., geography, institutions), productivity 
increases in the region’s human capital.  In expression (3), Ei(h) is the average level of human capital in 
region i and Li is the measure of labour in that region. Parameter ψ captures the importance of the 
quality of human capital: when ψ = 1 only the total quantity of human capital Hi = Ei(h)Li  matters for 
externalities; as ψ rises the quality of human capital becomes relatively more important than quantity.  
Parameter  γ  captures  the  overall  importance  of  externalities.    To  ease  notation,  we  suppress  the 8 
 
dependence of productivity on regional human capital until we examine the spatial equilibrium, in which 
productivity Ai is endogenously determined with regional sorting of labourers. 
Rentiers rent land and physical capital to firms, and housing to entrepreneurs and workers.  In 
region i, each rentier earns λiT and ηi by renting land and housing, where λi and ηi are rental rates, and 
ρiK by renting physical capital. A region’s land and housing endowments T and 1 are immobile; physical 
capital is fully mobile.  Labourers use their human capital in work or in entrepreneurship.  By operating 
in region i, a labourer with human capital h earns either profits πi(h) as an entrepreneur or wage income 
wi∙h as a worker, where wi is the wage rate.  All labourers, whether they become entrepreneurs or 
workers, are partially mobile: a labourer moving to region i loses φwi units of income, where φ<h.
4 
At t = 0, a labourer with human capital h selects the location and occupation that maximize his 
income.    The  housing  market  clears,  so  houses  are  allocated  to  each  region’s  labour.  At  t  =  1, 
entrepreneurs hire land, human, and physical capital. Production is carried out and distributed in wages, 
land rental, capital rental, housing rental and profits.  Consumption takes place. 




i K H H , ,  of entrepreneurial human capital 
E
i H , workers’ human capital 
W
i H , and physical capital Ki  such that: a) entrepreneurs hire workers, 
physical capital, and land to maximize profits, b) labourers optimally choose location, occupation and 
the fraction of income devoted to consumption and housing, and c) capital, labour, land and housing 
markets clear.  Because physical capital is fully mobile, there is a unique rental rate ρ.  Since land and 
housing are immobile, their rental rates λi and ηi vary across regions depending on productivity and 
population. To determine the sorting of labourers across regions and their choice between work and 
entrepreneurship within a region, we must compute regional wages wi and profits πi(hj). To do so, we 




i K H H , , .  Second, we solve 
                                                           
4 For simplicity, we assume that moving costs are a redistribution from migrants to locals (the latter may be viewed 
as providing moving services) and are non-rival with the time spent working.  This ensures that the human capital 
employed in a region, as well as the aggregate income of laborers, do not depend on moving costs.         9 
 
for the equilibrium allocation.  Throughout the analysis, the price of consumption is normalized to one.  
 
Production and occupational choice 
An entrepreneur with human capital h operating in region i maximizes his profit by solving: 
h i i h i h i i h i h i h i i K T H
T K H w T K H h A
h i h i h i
, , , , , ,
1
, , , , ,
max  
        
   ,                                              (4) 




i K H H , ,   firm j 
employs a share of entrepreneurial capital hj/
E
i H , it hires the others factors according to: 





















j i                                            (5) 
As in Lucas (1978), more skilled entrepreneurs run larger firms. 
Equation (5) implies that the aggregate regional output is given by: 
   
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1 .                                                          (6) 
Equation (6) allows us to determine wages, profits, and capital rental rates as a function of regional 
factor supplies via the usual (private) marginal product pricing.  That is: 
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                        (7) 
Thus, profit πi(h) is equal to πi (the marginal product of the entrepreneur’s human capital in region i), 
times the entrepreneur’s human capital h, namely πi(h) = πi∙h. 
Using Equation (7) we can solve for a labourer’s occupational choice.  A labourer j with human 
capital  hj  chooses  to  be  an  entrepreneur  if  πi∙hj>wi∙hj  and  a  worker  if  πi∙hj<wi∙hj.    In  equilibrium, 


































i i H H H    is total human capital in region i. 
E
i H  increases with the share of the total private 
return to human capital earned by entrepreneurs [i.e. with (1–α–β–δ)/(1–β–δ)].  Equation (8) describes 
the allocation of labour within in a region from the total quantities of human and physical capital (Hi,Ki). 
 
The spatial equilibrium: consumption, housing and mobility 
We consider symmetric spatial equilibria in which all productive regions share the same factor 
allocation (HG,KG), the same wage wG and rental rates λG and ηG, and unproductive regions share the 
same allocation (HB,KB), wage wB, and rentals λB and ηB. The uniformity of the capital rental ρ across 
regions pins down the allocation of physical capital as a function of the regional allocation of human 


































K ,                                                           (9) 
Intuitively,  the  physical  capital  stock  allocated  to  productive  regions  increases  in  their  productivity 
advantage AG/AB and in their relative human capital stock HG/HB.  Remember that the productivity 
differential in (10) is endogenously determined through externalities, as modelled in (3).  
To find the allocation of human capital, we must characterize labour mobility by computing the 
utility that labourers obtain from operating in different regions.  Labourers maximize their utility in (2) 
by devoting a share θ of their income to housing and the remaining share (1 – θ) to consumption.  Since 
the aggregate income of labourers in region i is equal to wiHi, the demand for housing in the regions is 
θ∙wiHi/ηi. With the unitary supply of housing, the housing rental rate is equal to: 
ηi= θ∙wi∙Hi.                                                                          (10) 
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which rises with the wage and falls with regional human capital Hi due to higher rents.   
To  describe  the  spatial  equilibrium,  we  need  to  find  the  ratio  between  the  wages  paid  in 
productive and unproductive regions as a function of their human capital.  Using the wage equation (7), 



















































                                                     
(12) 
Ceteris paribus, the wage is higher in productive regions.  A higher human capital stock has a negative 
effect on the wage because of diminishing returns but once externalities are taken into account the net 
effect is ambiguous.  In the remainder we assume: 
























A  ,    
which implies that the autarky wage and interest rates are higher in productive regions, so that both 
capital and labour tend to move there.   We can then prove the following (in Appendix 1): 
 
Proposition 1 Under the parametric restriction: 
(β – ψγ)(1 – θ) + θ(1 – δ)> 0,                                                            (13) 
 there is a stable equilibrium allocation HG and HB.  In this allocation: 
a)  There is a cutoff hm such that agent j migrates from an unproductive to a productive region if 
and only if hj ≥ hm.  The cutoff hm increases in the mobility cost φ. 
b)  Denote  by  B G H p H p H ) 1 (    the  aggregate  human  capital.  Then,  when  φ  =  0,  the 
equilibrium level of human capital in region i is independent of the region’s initial human capital 

















   

   

) 1 ( ) 1 )( (
1
) 1 ( ) 1 )( (
1
~
    

    

.                                                   (14) 




and HG increases in HG holding H constant. 
 
Since wages (and profits) are higher in the productive than in the unproductive regions, labour 
migrates to the former from the latter.  The cutoff rule in a) is intuitive: more skilled people have a 
greater incentive to pay the migration cost because the wage (or profit) gain they experience from doing 
so is higher. Even if mobility costs are zero, migration to the more productive regions is not universal. 
This is due to the limited supply of land T, which causes decreasing returns in production, and to the 
limited supply of housing, which implies that migration causes housing costs to rise until the incentive to 
migrate disappears.  Regional externalities moderate the adverse effect of fixed supplies of land and 
housing on mobility.  In fact, for migration to be interior, condition (13) must be met, which requires 
external effects ψγ to be sufficiently small relative to: i) the diminishing returns β due to land and ii) the 
sensitivity θ of house prices to regional human capital. 
In equilibrium, wages are higher in the more productive regions, wG>wB, but the housing rental 
rate is also higher there, ηG>ηB.  While (14) shows that under costless migration the human capital 
employed in a region only depends on its productivity, when mobility is imperfect (i.e., φ > 0) a region 
exogenously endowed with more human capital will employ more human capital in equilibrium.  This 
property will be important for the empirical analysis.  When ψ = 1 and φ = 0, national output is equal to: 
     
       T K H H H A Y
W E   

1 
,                                                          (15) 
where A

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
 of exogenous parameters. More generally, under 
condition (13) the Lucas-Lucas model yields the following equation for firm level output:                                                                                              
       
j i j i j i j i i i j i T K H h L h E A y , , ,
1
, ) (
~      ,                                                     (16) 13 
 
and the following equation for regional output: 
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Empirical Predictions of the Model 
To obtain predictions on the role of schooling, we need to specify a link between human capital 
(which we do not observe) and schooling (which we do observe). We follow the Mincerian approach in 
which for an individual j the link between human capital and schooling is: 
  j j j S h  exp  ,                                                                   (18) 
where Sj ≥ 0 and μj ≥ 0 are two random variables (distributed to ensure that the distribution of hj is 
Pareto).  The return to schooling μi varies across individuals, potentially due to talent. This allows us to 
estimate  different  returns  to  schooling  for  workers  and  entrepreneurs.  Card  (1999)  offers  some 
evidence  of  heterogeneity  in  the  returns  to  schooling.    Human  capital  in  region  i  is  then  equal  to
   







h i dSd S g e h hdF , where ) (h dFi  is the density of region i labourers’ with human 
capital  h  and  ) , (  S gi   is  the  density  of  region  i  labourers  having  human  capital 
S e h
  ,  so  that  
i S i L dSd S g     0 , 0 ) , (
   .  In line with macro studies, in our regressions we express average human 
capital in the region as a first order expansion around the mean Mincerian return and years of schooling: 
i i S
i e h E
 
 ) (  ,                                                                      (19) 
where i S is average schooling while  i  is the average Mincerian return, both computed in region i. 
 
Regional Income Differences 
To test Equation (17) we need to specify a regression in terms of observables, which entails 
regressing regional per capita income on human capital and population (we do not have regional data 14 
 









i i H A where B > 
0 is a constant.  Substituting this condition as well as Equation (19) into Equation (17) we find that: 
ln(Yi/Li) = C + [1/(1 – δ)]ln  ̃  + [1+ γψ –β/(1 – δ)] i  i S  + [γ – β/(1 – δ)]lnLi,                  (20) 
where C is a constant absorbed by the country fixed effect.  If mobility is costly (φ>0), our model predicts 
that regional human capital should vary with the initial exogenous endowment Hi and that regional 
income differences are also triggered by fixed housing supply.  Estimating (20) using OLS implies that the 
coefficient on average regional schooling should be interpreted as the product of the “technological” 
parameter (1+ γψ – β) and the nation-wide average of the regional Mincerian returns  i  . 
The coefficient [γ – β/(1 – δ)] on population Li captures the benefit γ of increasing regional 
workforce  in  terms  of  externalities  minus  the  cost  β  of  crowding  the  fixed  land  supply.  A  similar 
interpretation holds with respect to the schooling coefficient (1+ γψ – β). The estimation of Equation 
(20) raises a serious concern: since in our model human capital migrates to more productive regions, any 
mismeasurement of regional productivity Ai may contaminate the coefficient of regional human capital. 
We deal with this issue in two steps. First, we control in regression (20) for proxies of Ai.  Second, we 
compare these results to the coefficients obtained from the firm level regressions and to the calibration 
exercises performed by the development accounting literature. These comparisons allow us to assess 
the severity of the endogeneity problem in the estimation of (20). 
 
Firm-Level Productivity   
In (16), the output of a firm j operating in region i depends on the human capital hE,j of the 
entrepreneur, as determined by his schooling SE,j and return to schooling ij E,  , and on the average 
human capital E(hW,j) of workers, which again we approximate by 
j W j W S e
, ,  
(where  j W,   and  j W S ,  are 15 
 
average values in the firm’s workforce). Ceteris paribus, in our model entrepreneurs have a higher 
return to schooling than workers because in region i an entrepreneur with schooling S is someone 
whose  return  satisfies  i E
S h e , 
 ,  where  i E h , is  the  human  capital  threshold  for  becoming  an 
entrepreneur in region i.  At a schooling level S, the entrepreneurial class includes talented labourers 
whose return satisfies  S h S i E i E / ln ) ( , ,     while labourers with  ) ( , S i E     become workers. 
    By writing Equation (16) in terms of firm-level output per worker yi,j/li,j and by exploiting the 
expressions for entrepreneurs’ and workers human capital, we obtain the prediction: 
ln(yi,j/li,j) = ln  ̃  + (1–α–β–δ) j E,  SE,ij + α j W,  j W S ,  + 
             (1–α–β–δ)ln(
E
j i l , /li,j) + αln(
W
j i l , /li,j)+δlnki,j +βlnti,j + γlnLi + γψ i  i S ,                 (21) 
Where xi,j = Xi,j/li,j denote per-worker values, 
E
j i l , /li,j and 
W
j i l , /li,j capture the share of a firm’s total 
employment on managerial and non-managerial jobs, respectively.  Taken literally, in our model output 
per-worker is equalized across firms within a region.  More realistically, though, output per-worker is 
equalized across firms ex-ante, but its ex-post value varies as a result of stochastic ex-post changes in 
the values of firm level TFP and inputs.  This is the variation we appeal to when estimating (21).
5   
When  estimating  (21)  using  OLS,  the coefficient  on  the  entrepreneur’s schooling  should  be 
interpreted as the product of entrepreneurs’ rents (1–α–β–δ) and a nation-wide average Mincerian 
entrepreneurs’  return  to  education E  .    The  coefficient  on  workers’  average  schooling  should  be 
interpreted as the labour share α times a nation-wide average Mincerian returns to workers  W  . The 
                                                           
5 Formally, suppose that if ex-ante a firm hires Xi,j units of a productive factor, this results in Xi,j = εX∙ Xi,j units of 
the same factor being employed in production ex-post, where εX is a random shock to the value of inputs (e.g. an 
unpredictable change  in the value of equipment, in the size of the workforce and so on). Given the Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the firm’s ex-ante optimization problem (occurring with respect to the ex-ante inputs Xi,j) 
does not change with respect to Equations (4) and (5). The only change is that a firm’s productivity also includes 
expectations of the random factors εX. Crucially, this formulation implies that ex-ante returns are equalized, ex-
post returns are not, which allows us to estimate (21) insofar as our input measures captures the ex-pot values Xi,j.    16 
 
coefficient on regional schooling should be interpreted as the product of the externality parameter γψ 
and the population-wide average Mincerian return  .
6 
The estimation of (21) allows us to separate the role of the “low human capital” of workers from 
the “high human capital” of entrepreneurs in shaping firm productivity.  Since the selection of talented 
entrepreneurs into more productive regions/industries may contaminate our results, we first estimate 
(21) by controlling for the full set of regionXindustry dummies.  In addition, we estimate (21) by directly 
controlling for region specific variables to assess the importance of externalities from the coefficient γ 
on population and the coefficient γψ  on regional schooling. In this case, however, migration of human 
capital to more productive regions may give the false impression of positive externalities, creating the 
identification issue present in estimating (21).  We deal with this problem by controlling for proxies for 
Ai and by comparing our estimation results to standard calibrations of externalities. 
 
III.  Data. 
Our analysis is based on measures of income, geography, institutions, infrastructure, and culture 
in up to 110 (out of 193 recognized sovereign) countries for which we found regional data on either 
income  or  education.    Almost  all  countries  in  the  world  have  administrative  divisions.
7  In  turn, 
administrative divisions may have different levels.  For instance a country may be divided into states or 
provinces, which are further subdivided into counties or municipalities.  For each variable, we collect 
data at the highest administrative division available (i.e., states and provinces rather than counties or 
municipalities) or, when such data does not exist, at the statistical division (e.g. the Eurostat NUTS in 
                                                           
6Both the regional level Equation (20) and the firm level Equation (21) imply that the average return to schooling 
should vary across regions.   One way to  empirically account for such possibility is to run random coefficient 
regressions. We have performed this analysis and the results change very little (the results on human capital 
become slightly stronger).  We do not report the results to save space.  
7 The exceptions are Cook Islands, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Macau, Malta, Monaco, Niue, Puerto Rico, Vatican City, 
Singapore, and Tuvalu. 17 
 
Europe) that is closest to it.   Because we focus on regions, and typically run regressions with country 
fixed effects, we do not include countries with no administrative divisions in the sample.   
The  reporting  level  for  data  on  income,  geography,  institutions,  infrastructure,  and  culture 
differs  across  variables.    GDP  and  education  are  typically  available  at  the  first-level  administrative 
division  (i.e.,  states  and  provinces).    In  contrast,  GIS  geo-spatial  data  on  geography,  climate,  and 
infrastructure is typically available for areas as small as 10 km
2.  Finally, survey data on institutions and 
culture are typically available at the municipal level.  In our empirical analysis, we aggregate all variables 
for each country to a region from the most disaggregated level of reporting available.
8  To illustrate, we 
have GDP data for 27 first-level administrative regions in Brazil, corresponding to its 26 states plus the 
Federal District, but survey data on institutions for 248 municipalities.  For our empirical analysis, we 
aggregate the data on institutions by taking the simple average of all observations for establishments 
located in the same first-level administrative division.  Similarly, we aggregate the GIS geo-spatial data 
on geography, climate, and infrastructure at the first-administrative level using the Collins-Bartholomew 
World Digital Map.   
The final data set has 1,569 regions in 110 countries: (1) 79 countries have regions at the first-
level administrative division; and (2) 31 countries have regions at a more aggregated level than the first-
administrative level because one or several variables (often education) are unavailable at the first-
administrative level.  For example, Ireland has 34 first-level divisions (i.e., 29 counties and 5 cities), but 
publishes GDP per capita data for 8 regions and education for 2 regions. Thus, we aggregate all the Irish 
data to match the 2 regions for which education statistics are available.  The data Appendix identifies 
                                                           
8 We used a variety of aggregation procedures.  Specifically, we computed population-weighted averages for GDP 
per capita and years of schooling.  We computed regional averages for temperature, precipitation, distance to 
coast, travel time, and soil characteristics by first summing the (average) values of the relevant variable for all grid 
cells lying within a region and then dividing by the number of cells lying within a region.  We computed regional 
averages for the density (e.g., power lines) and natural resources variables (oil and gas) by first summing the 
relevant variable for all grid cells within a region and then dividing by the region’s population.  We averaged the 
responses within a region for all the variables from the Enterprise and World Value Surveys.  We sum up the 
number  of  unique  ethnic  groups  and  computed  the  probability  that  people  within  a  region  speak  the  same 
language based on the total number of people in each “language” area. 18 
 
the reporting level for the regions in our dataset.  As noted earlier, all countries have administrative 
divisions (although 31 countries in our sample report statistics for statistical regions).  The principal 
constraint on the sample is the availability of human capital data.  Of course, all countries have periodic 
censuses and thus have sub-national data on human capital, but these data are hard to find.    
Figure 1 portrays the 1,569 regions in our sample.  It shows that coverage is extensive outside of 
North  and  sub-Saharan  Africa.    Sample  coverage  is  strongly  related  to  a  country’s  surface  area, 
presumably because very small countries do not report regional data.  For example, the smallest country 
in our dataset is Lebanon (10,400 km
2), leaving out of our sample some very prosperous countries such 
as Luxembourg (2,590 km
2) and Singapore (699 km
2).  Among countries ranked by their surface area, we 
only have data for 14% of the first (smallest) 50 countries, 44% of the first 100 countries, and 53% of the 
first 150 countries.  Similarly, sample coverage rises with the absolute level of GDP but not with GDP per 
capita.  For example, we have data for 18% the first 50 countries ranked in terms of GDP in 2005, 38% of 
the first 100 countries, and 49% of the first 150 countries.  The comparable figures for countries ranked 
on the basis of GDP per capita are 52%, 57% and 57%, respectively.  Since sample coverage rises with 
GDP, it turns out that the countries in our sample account for 97% of world GDP in 2005.    
Our  final  dataset  has  regional  income  data  for  107  countries  in  2005,  drawn  from  sources 
including National Statistics Offices and other government agencies (42 countries), Human Development 
Reports (36 countries), OECDStats (26 countries), the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey 
(Ghana and Kazakhstan), and IPUMS (Israel).  When regional income data for 2005 is missing, we use 
log-linear interpolation based on as much data as it is available for the period 1990-2008 or, when 
interpolation is not possible, the closest available year.
9  Our measure of regional income per capita is 
typically based on value added but we use data on income (6 countries), expenditure (8 countries), 
wages (3 countries), gross value added (2 countries), and consumption, investment and government 
                                                           
9  We are missing regional GDP per capita for Bangladesh and Costa Rica and national GDP per capita in PPP terms 
for Cuba. 19 
 
expenditure (1 country)  to  fill-in missing  values.   We measure  regional  GDP  in  current  purchasing-
power-parity dollars as we lack data on regional price indexes.  To ensure consistency with the national 
GDP figures reported by World Development Indicators, we adjust regional income values so that -- 
when  weighted  by  population--  they total  GDP  at  the  country  level.    Not surprisingly,  adjustments 
exceeding 20% were necessary in 19 out of the 20 countries for which use GDP proxies rather than 
actual GDP.  Adjustments exceeding 20% were also necessary in 13 countries (Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nepal, Niger, Philippines, Senegal, Swaziland, Syria, 
Uganda, and Venezuela) where our GDP data are in real terms.     
We compute regional income per capita using population data from Thomas Brinkhoff: City 
Population, which collects official census data as well as population estimates for regions where official 
census data are unavailable.
10  We adjust these regional population values so that their sum matches 
the country’s population in the World Development Indicators database.  This adjustment exceeds 10% 
for 6 countries: Bangladesh (+13%), Benin (+11%), Democratic Republic of Congo (-10.5%), Gabon (-
25%), Swaziland (+16%) and Uzbekistan (-22%).    
In addition, we examine productivity and its determinants using establishment-level data from 
the Enterprise Survey for as many as 53,957 establishments in 82 countries and 539 of the regions in our 
sample.
11  We collect operating data on sales, cost of raw materials, cost of labor, cost of electricity, and 
the cost of communications.  We also collect data on the book value of property, plant, and equipment.  
Critically, the Enterprise Survey keeps track of the highest educational attainment of the establishment’s 
top manager as well as of its workers.  Finally, we collect the two-digit ISIC code (e.g., food, textiles, 
chemicals, etc.) of the establishments in our sample. Like the economic census and business registry 
                                                           
10We also used data from OECDStats (for Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and the UK) and the National Statistics 
Office of Macedonia. 
11 The Enterprise Survey data was collected between 2002 and 2009.  When data from the Enterprise Survey for 
one of the countries in our sample are available for multiple years, we use the most recent one. 20 
 
data, the Enterprise Survey data only covers registered establishments.  A limitation of the Enterprise 
Survey data is that it largely excludes OECD countries (Ireland and Mexico are the exceptions).    
We  relate  regional  economic  development  to  five  sets  of  potential  determinants:    (1) 
geography, (2) education, (3) institutions, (4) infrastructure, and (5) culture.  To narrow down the list of 
candidate variables, we restrict attention to variables that are available at the regional level for at least 
40 countries and 200 regions. 
We  use  three  measures  of  geography  and  natural  resources  obtained  from  the  WorldClim 
database, which are available for all regions of the world.  They include the average temperature during 
the period 1950-2000, the (inverse) average distance between the cells in a region and the nearest 
coastline, and the estimated volume of oil production and reserves in the year 2000.
12 
We gather data on the educational attainment of the population 15 years and older for 106 
countries and 1491 regions from EPDC Data Center (55 countries), Eurostat (17 countries), National 
Statistics Offices (27 countries) and IPUMS (7 countries); see the data appendix for sources.  We collect 
data on school attainment during the period 1990-2006 and use data for the most recently available 
period.  We compute years of schooling following Barro and Lee (1993).  Specifically, we use UNESCO 
data on the duration of primary and secondary school in each country and assume: (a) zero years of 
school for the pre-primary level, (b) 4 additional years of school for tertiary education, and (c) zero 
additional years of school for post-graduate degrees.  We do not use data on incomplete levels because 
it is only available for about half of the countries in the sample.  For example, we assume zero years of 
additional school for the lower secondary level.  For each region, we compute average years of schooling 
as the weighted sum of the years of school required to achieve each educational level, where the 
weights are the fraction of the population aged 15 an older that has completed each level of education. 
                                                           
12 The results in the paper are robust to controlling for the standard deviation of temperature, the average annual 
precipitation during the period 1950-2000, the average output for multiple cropping of rain-fed and irrigated 
cereals during the period 1960-1996, the estimated volume of natural gas production and reserves in year 2000, 
and dummies for the presence of various minerals in the year 2005. 21 
 
To illustrate these calculations consider the Mexican state of Chihuahua.  The EPDC data on the 
highest educational attainment of the population 15 years and older in Chihuahua in 2005 shows that 
4.99% of the that population had no schooling, 13.76% had incomplete primary school, 22.12% had 
complete primary school, 5.10% had incomplete lower secondary school, 23.04% had complete lower 
secondary school, 17.94% had complete upper secondary school, and 13.05% had complete tertiary 
school.  Next, based on UNESCO’s mapping of the national educational system of Mexico, we assign six 
years of schooling to people who have completed primary school and 12 years of schooling to those that 
have  completed  secondary  school.    Finally,  we calculate  the  average  years of  schooling  in  2005  in 
Chihuahua  as  the  sum  of:  (1)  six  years  times  the  fraction  of  people  whose  highest  educational 
attainment level is complete primary school (22.12%), incomplete lower secondary (5.1%), or complete 
lower secondary school (23.04%);  (2) 12 years times the fraction of people whose highest attainment 
level is complete upper secondary school (17.94%); and (3) 16 years times the fraction of people whose 
highest attainment level is complete tertiary school.  Accordingly, we estimate that the average years of 
schooling  of  the  population  15  and  older  in  Chihuahua  in  2005  is  7.26  years 
(=6*0.5026+12*0.1794+16*0.1305). 
We compute years of schooling at the country-level by weighting the average years of schooling 
for each region by the fraction of the country’s population 15 and older in that region.   The correlation 
between this measure and the number of years of schooling for the population 15 years and older in 
Barro and Lee (2010) is 0.9.   For the average (median) country in our sample, the number of years of 
schooling in Barro and Lee (2010) is 8.18 vs. 6.88 in ours (8.56  vs.6.92 years).   Two factors could 
potentially explain why the Barro-Lee dataset yields a higher level of educational attainment than ours: 
(1) Barro-Lee captures incomplete degrees while we do not; and (2) education levels have increased 
rapidly  over  time  but  some  of  our  educational  attainment  data  is  stale  (e.g.  for  14  countries  our 
educational attainment data is for the year 2000 or earlier).  To make the Barro and Lee (2010) measure 22 
 
of educational attainment more comparable to ours, we make two adjustments to their data.  First, we 
apply our methodology to the Barro-Lee dataset and compute the level of educational attainment in 
2005.   After this first adjustment, the level of educational attainment computed with the Barro-Lee 
dataset for the average (median) country in our sample drops to 7.07  (7.23).  Second, we apply our 
methodology to the Barro-Lee dataset but –rather than use data for 2005 -- use figures for the year that 
best matches the year in our dataset.   After this second adjustment, the level of educational attainment 
using the Barro-Lee dataset  for the average (median) country in our dataset drop further to 6.95 
(7.22).
13  Since  most  of  our  results  are  run  with  country-fixed  effects,  country-level  biases  in  our 
measure of human capital do not affect our results.
14 
We gather data on seven measures of the quality of institutions from the Enterprise Survey and 
the Sub-national Doing Business Reports.  The Enterprise Survey covers as many as 80 of the countries 
and 410 of the regions in our sample.
15  The Enterprise Survey asked business managers to quantify: (1) 
informal payments in the past year (percent of sales spent in informal payments by a typical firm in the 
respondent’s industry), (2) the number of days spent in meeting with tax authorities in the past year, (3) 
the number of days without electricity in the previous year, and (4) security costs (cost of security 
equipment, personnel, or professional security service as a percentage of sales).  The Enterprise Survey 
also asks managers to rate a variety of obstacles to doing business, including: (1) access to land, and (2) 
                                                           
13After the second adjustment, there are 5 countries (i.e., Great Britain, Poland, Switzerland, Syria, and Uruguay) 
for which our educational attainment numbers remain 25% or more above the adjusted Barro-Lee numbers, and 
12  countries  (i.e.,  Armenia,  Bangladesh,  Benin,  Bolivia,  Cambodia,  Honduras,  Laos,  Morocco,  Niger,  Pakistan, 
Senegal, and Sri Lanka) for which our numbers remain 25% or more below the adjusted Barro-Lee numbers. In all 
but two of these 17 cases (Great Britain and Poland are the two exceptions), data sources differ (our data for these 
two countries comes from household or individual surveys and theirs from national censuses). For Great Britain we 
have 12.14 years of schooling, as does the OECD, while Barro-Lee has 9.21.  For Poland, we have 11.15 years of 
schooling while Barro-Lee has 9.65 and the OECD has 10.55. 
14 Results for our cross-country regressions are qualitatively similar if we use educational attainment from Barro-
Lee (2010) rather than the population-weighted average of regional values.   
15  The main reason why we have fewer regions with measures of institutions than regions with productivity data is 
because we imposed a filter of a minimum of 10 establishments answering the particular institutions question. The 
rest of the discrepancy in the number of regions is because some questions about institutions were not included in 
the survey for some countries. 23 
 
access to finance.
16  For each of these obstacles to doing business, we keep track of the percentage of 
the respondents that rate the item as a moderate, a major, or a very severe obstacle to business. The 
final  Enterprise  Survey  variable  that  we  examine  is  the  perception  of  government  predictability 
(measured as the percentage of respondents who tend to agree, agree in most cases, or fully agree that 
government officials’ interpretations of regulations are consistent and predictable). 
To make sure that our results on the importance of institutions are not driven by measurement 
error, we also gather objective measures of the quality of institutions from the Sub-national Doing 
Business Reports, which are available for 19 countries and 180 regions in our sample.  We focus on the 
number  of  procedures  and  their  cost  in  four  areas:  starting  a  new  business,  enforcing  contracts, 
registering property, and dealing with licenses. Interestingly, variation in the cost of regulation swamps 
the variation in the number of procedures. For example, there is no variation in the number of steps 
required to enforce a contract in the 30 Chinese cities tracked by the Sub-National Doing Business 
Report.  However, the estimated time to enforce a contract ranges from 112 days in the city of Nanjing 
(Jiangsu) to 540 days in the city of Changchun (Jilin). As it turns out, results using objective measures of 
institutions are qualitatively similar to the results using subjective measures that we have described. 
We use two measures of infrastructure.  The first is the density of power lines in 1997 from the 
US Geological Survey Global GIS database.
17  The second measure is the average estimated travel time 
between cells in a region and the nearest city of 50,000 people or more in the year 2000 from the Global 
Environment Monitoring Unit.  Both measures of infrastructure are available for all regions of the world. 
Cultural variables are the last set of potential determinants of regional income that we examine.  
We gather two proxies for cultural values and attitudes from the World Value Survey for as many as 75 
                                                           
16 From the Enterprise Survey, we also assembled data on the number of days in the past year with telephone 
outages, the percentage of sales reported to the tax authorities, and the confidence that the judicial system would 
enforce contracts and property rights in business.  Results for these variables are available upon request. 
17 Results using other density measures of infrastructure (e.g. air fields, highways, and roads) also available on the 
US Geological Survey Global GIS database are qualitatively similar.   24 
 
of our sample countries and 745 of our regions.
18,19 The first survey measure is the percentage of 
respondents  in  each  region  that  answer  that  “most  people  can  be  trusted”  when  asked  whether 
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in 
dealing with people?" The second measure is a proxy for civic values based on whether each of the 
following behaviors "can always be justified, never be justified or something in between.": (a) "claiming 
government  benefits  which  you  are  not  entitled  to";  (b)  "avoiding  a  fare  on  public  transport";  (c) 
"cheating on taxes if you have the chance"; and (d) "someone taking a bribe" (Knack and Keefer, 1997).
20 
In addition, we gather two measures of fractionalization for up to 1,568 regions and 110 of our sample 
countries. The first one is simply the number of ethnic groups that inhabited each region in 1964.  The 
second one  is  the  probability  that  a  randomly  chosen  person  in a  region  shares  the  same mother 
language with a randomly chosen people from the rest of the country in 2004.     
Finally, in addition to running regressions using regional data, we examine GDP per capita at the 
country level, which come from World Development Indicators.  All the other country-level variables in 
the  paper  are  computed  based  on  our  regional  data  rather  than  drawn  from  primary  sources. 
Specifically, the country-level analogs of our regional measures of education, geography, institutions, 
public  goods,  and  culture  are  the  area-  and  population-weighted  averages of  the  relevant  regional 
variables, as appropriate.     
                                                           
18 We set to missing World Value Survey data for five countries (France, Japan, Philippines, Russia, and the United 
States) because they are only available at a very coarse level.  
19 The World Value Survey was collected between 1981 and 2005.  When data from the World Value Survey for 
one of the countries in our sample are available for multiple years, we use the most recent one. 
20  We  also  examined  proxies  for  confidence  in  various  institutions  (government,  parliament,  armed  forces, 
education, civil service, police, and justice), for what is important in people’s lives (family, friends, leisure, politics, 
work, and religion) as well as for characteristics valued in children (determination, faith, hard work, imagination, 
independence, obedience, responsibility, thrift, and unselfishness).  Moreover, we also examined proxies for broad 
cultural attitudes  with regards to authority (percent  who think that one  must always love and respect one’s 
parents regardless of their qualities and faults), tolerance for other people (percent who select tolerance and 
respect for other people as an important quality for children to learn), and family (percent who think that parents 
have a duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being).  Finally, we examined 
the  percentage  of  respondents  that  participate  in  professional  and  civic  associations.    The  results  for  these 
variables are qualitatively similar to the results for the WVS variables that we discuss in the text.  25 
 
Table 1 describes our variables and Table 2 summarizes our data.   For each variable we examine 
in the regional regressions, it shows the number of regions for which we have the information, the 
number of countries these regions are in, the median and the average number of regions per country, 
and the median range and standard deviation within a country. The data show substantial income 
inequality among regions within a country.   On average, the ratio of the income in the richest region to 
that in the poorest region is 4.41.   This ratio is 3.74 in both Africa and Europe, 4.60 in North America, 
5.61 in South America, and 5.63 in Asia.    The country with the highest ratio of incomes in the richest to 
that  in  the  poorest  region  is  Russia  (43.3);  the  country  with  the  lowest  ratio  is  Pakistan  (1.32).    
Interestingly, this ratio is 5.16 for the United States, 2.59 for Germany, 1.93 for France, and 2.03 for 
Italy.   Italy has attracted enormous attention because of differences in income between its North and 
its South, usually attributed to culture.  As it turns out, Italian regional inequality is not unusual. We also 
note that regional inequality of incomes within a country, as measured by the standard deviation of the 
logarithm of per capita incomes, declines with income, perhaps because richer countries have more 
equalizing policies (Figure 2).   
There  is  likewise  substantial  inequality  in  education  among  regions  within  a  country.    On 
average, the ratio of educational attainment in the richest region to that in the poorest region is 1.80.  
This ratio is 2.71 for Africa, 1.68 for Asia, 1.16 for Europe, 1.33 for North America, and 1.81 for South 
America.  The highest ratio is in Burkina Faso (14.66), where education is 0.22 in the Sahel region and 
3.20 in the Centre region.  The lowest ratio is 1.05 in Ireland.  One striking fact in this data is the much 
great regional equality in the distribution of education in the richer than in the poorer countries.   Figure 
3 presents the evidence for the relationship between standard deviation of education levels in a country 
and its per capita income.  Such tendency to equality might follow from the more uniform educational 
policies in richer countries, and may account for greater regional income equality in the richer countries.  26 
 
The patterns of inequality among regions within countries is interesting for some of the other 
variables as well.  Table 2 shows that differences in endowments, such as temperature and distance to 
coast, are small, which suggests that these variables will have difficulty in explaining regional differences 
in per capita income.  Density of power lines and travel time to the next big city varies a great deal 
across regions, suggesting that urban theories of development might be helpful in explaining regional 
inequality.      There  is  also  considerable  variation  across  regions  in  the  estimates  of  the  quality  of 
institutions, which suggests that, at least in principle, there is a regional aspect to institutional quality 
that could relate to differences in economic development. 
 
IV.   Accounting for National and Regional Productivity.  
In this section, we present cross-country and cross-region evidence on the determinants of 
productivity.   We present national regressions only for comparison.  These regressions are difficult to 
interpret in our model because it is not possible to express national output in closed form.   More 
importantly, the problem of endogeneity of education is particularly severe in the national context.  
With respect to regional income, our benchmark is Equation (20).  As already mentioned, we have 
measures of average education at the regional level, but we do not have either national or regional data 
on physical capital (except for public infrastructure) or other inputs, so these variables only appear in 
the firm-level regressions in Section V.   
Table 3 presents our basic regional results in perhaps the most transparent way.   It reports the 
results of univariate regressions of regional GDP per capita on its possible determinants, all with country 
fixed effects.  Such specifications are loaded in favor of each variable seeming important since it does 
not  need  to  compete  with  any  other  variable.    We  report  both  the  within  country  and  between 
countries R
2 of these regressions.    The first row shows that education explains 58% of between country 
variation of per capita income, and 38% of within country variation of per capita income.   Figure 4 27 
 
shows, for Brazil, Colombia, India, and Russia, the striking raw correlation between regional schooling 
and per capita income.  Although several other variables explain a significant share of between country 
variation, none comes close to education in explaining within country variation in income per capita. 
Starting  with  geographical  variables,  temperature  and  inverse  distance  to  coast  –  taken 
individually – explain 27 and 13 percent of between country income variation, but 1 and 4 percent 
respectively  of  within  country  variation.    Oil  explains  a  trivial  amount  of  variation  at  either  level.   
Turning to institutions, some of the variables, such as access to finance or the number of days it takes to 
file a tax return, explain a considerable share of cross-country variation, consistent with the empirical 
findings at the cross-country level such as King and Levine (1993) or Acemoglu et al. (2001), but none 
explains  more  than  2  percent  of  within  country  variation  of  per  capita  incomes.    Indicators  of 
infrastructure or other public good provision do slightly better:  on their own many explain a large share 
of between country variation, while density of power lines and travel time account for up to 7% of 
within country variation.  These variables are obviously highly endogenous, and still do much worse than 
education.  Some of the cultural variables account for a substantial share of between country variation, 
none account for much of within country variation.  Of course, culture might operate at the national 
rather than the sub-national level, although we note that much of the research on trust focuses on 
regional rather than national differences (e.g., Putnam 1993).  After presenting the regression results, 
we try to explain why some of these variables do so poorly.  
Tables 4 through 6 show the multivariate regression results at the national and regional level.  
Table 4 presents the baseline regressions of national (Panel A) and regional (Panel B) per capita income 
on geography and education, controlling in some instances for population or employment, as suggested 
by our model.  At the country level, temperature, inverse distance to coast, and oil endowment are all 
highly statistically significant in explaining cross-country variation in incomes, and explain an impressive 28 
 
50% of the variance.   Education is also statistically significant, with a coefficient of .25, raising the R
2 to 
63%.  Note that oil comes in positive and highly statistically significant.     
As Panel B shows, the coefficients on geography and education continue to be significant at the 
regional level.  However, the within country R
2 is much higher for education than for the geographic 
variables.   The coefficient on the regional labour force is now positive and statistically significant, and 
ranges from .01 for population to .07 for employment.   The coefficient on education is around .27.   
Table  5  presents  country-level  regressions  with  measures  of  institutions  (Panel  A)  and  of 
infrastructure and culture (Panel B) added to the specification in Table 4.  Education remains highly 
statistically significant in each specification, and its coefficient does not fall much.  At the country level, 
only the logarithm of tax days is statistically significant.  The last two rows of Table 5 show the adjusted 
R
2 of each regression if we omit the institutional (or infrastructure or cultural) variable, as well as the 
adjusted R
2 if we omit education.   Dropping education sharply reduces explanatory power, while the 
only institutional variable that adds explanatory power is the logarithm of tax days.  
Table 6 presents the corresponding results at the regional level.   The education coefficient is 
slightly higher than in Table 4, and is highly significant, as illustrated in Figure 5.   Institutional variables 
are almost never significant, and their incremental explanatory power is tiny.  We find a small adverse 
effect of ethnic heterogeneity on income at the regional level, although the incremental explanatory 
power of all the institutional and cultural variables is small
21. 
We have conducted several robustness checks of these findings, and here summarize but do not 
present the results.  First, we eliminated regions that include national capitals from the regressions; the 
results are not materially affected.  Second, we included measures of regional population density in the 
specifications; density is typically insignificant and other results are not importantly affected.  Third, we 
                                                           
21 We have tested the robustness of these results using data on regional luminosity instead of per capita income 
(see  Henderson,  Storeygard,  and  Weil  2009).    The  results  are  highly  consistent  with  the  evidence  we  have 
described, both with respect to the importance of human capital, and the evidence of relative unimportance of 
other factors, in accounting for cross-regional differences.  29 
 
have rerun all the regressions breaking down our aggregated educational attainment measure into 
measures,  for  each  level  of  educational  attainment  between  1  and  13  years,  of  the  presence  of 
individuals  at  that  level  of  education  in  that  region.      Educational  variables  continue  to  be  highly 
correlated  with  per  capita  income,  and  the  coefficients  increase  monotonically  with  the  level  of 
attainment.  That is, having more people at a higher level of education is associated with higher income.    
What  are  some  of  the  possible  explanations  of  the  low  explanatory  power  of  institutions, 
keeping in mind that endogeneity of institutions should if anything raise the coefficients?  It is possible 
that we have inappropriate measures of institutions, although the measures we have are commonly 
considered to be relevant for economic outcomes.  It is also possible that the measures from Enterprise 
Surveys are particularly noisy, although one should remember that these are surveys of managers who 
should be particularly focused on institutional constraints.   In general, such subjective assessments 
correlate much better with measures of development than objective measures of institutions (Glaeser 
et al. 2004).  It is also likely that at least some institutions only matter at the national level, if, for 
example, the critical-to-development business activity is concentrated in the capital.    
To shed further light on these issues, Table 7 presents at the national level (we have no regional 
data) regressions in the same format as Table 5, but using standard measures of institutions, including 
autocracy, constraints on the executive, expropriation risk, proportional representation, and corruption.  
Except for proportional representation, all of these variables are highly statistically significant in these 
specifications.  However, with the exception of expropriation risk and corruption, both of which are 
highly endogenous, the incremental explanatory power of institutional variables is minimal, and in most 
cases much smaller than the incremental explanatory power of education.  Perhaps the more important 
point is that Enterprise Surveys do not cover rich countries.  If we run the regressions in Table 7 for the 
72 countries with data on informal payments, we find that proportional representation is insignificant, 
autocracy and executive constraints are significant at only 10% level, expropriation risk is significant at 30 
 
the 5% level, and corruption is significant at the 1% level.  Critically, the value of estimated coefficients 
falls, rather than standard errors rising.  Our bottom line is that the weakness of institutional variables 
results in part from different (and possibly but not definitely inferior) data, and in part from the focus on 
poorer countries, for which institutional variables indeed matter less.   
Due to potential migration of better educated workers to more productive regions, we cannot 
interpret the large education coefficients - which appear to come through with a similar magnitude 
across a range of specifications – as the causal impact of human capital on regional income.  To address 
this problem, we next estimate the role of human capital in the production function by looking at firm 
level evidence based on Enterprise Surveys.  By combining estimation and calibration, we then assess 
the extent to which the role of human capital at the firm level can account for its role across regions. 
 
V.  Firm-Level Evidence. 
In Tables 8-10, we turn to the micro evidence and estimate essentially Equation (21).   We use 
the  Enterprise  Survey  data  described  in  Section  III.  In  establishment-level  regressions,  we  try  to 
disentangle  managerial/entrepreneurial  human  capital,  worker  human  capital,  and  human  capital 
externalities. To address the concern that the sorting of entrepreneurs by unobservable skills into more 
productive regions may contaminate our estimates of entrepreneurial returns to schooling as well as of 
human  capital  externalities,  in  Table  8  we  use  an  extremely  flexible  specification  that  controls  for 
region-industry interactions by including region X industry fixed effects and no regional education.  This 
enables  us  to  focus on  the  effect  of  managerial/entrepreneurial  education  on  productivity  without 
worrying about regional and sectoral productivity, which are subsumed in the fixed effects.  In Tables 9 
and 10 we then turn to an examination of human capital externalities, first with regional education only, 
and then adding geographic variables. All standard errors are clustered at the regional level. We have 
experimented with some indicators of regional institutions and infrastructure as independent variables, 31 
 
but consistent with the findings for regional data, they are usually insignificant, and hence we do not 
focus on these results. 
We use three dependent variables to proxy for productivity.   First, we look at the log of the 
establishment sales per worker, yi,j/li,j.  Second, we look at a rough measure of value added, namely the 
logarithm of sales net out raw material inputs, per worker.  Third, we run regressions with the log of 
average wages paid by the establishment (which in our Cobb-Douglas production function correspond to 
a constant fraction of output) as a dependent variable.  We measure capital (which includes both land ti,j 
and physical capital ki,j) by the log of property, plant and equipment per employee. As an alternative, we 
proxy for physical capital by the log of expenditure on energy per employee.  We also use the log of the 
number of employees, which is a proxy of li,j, to control for the share of the entrepreneur’s labour 
E
j i l , /li,j  
and of the workers’ labour 
W
j i l , /li,j. Indeed, assuming that each firm has only one entrepreneur we have 
E
j i l , /li,j = 1/li,j and 
W
j i l , /li,j = (li,j-1)/li,j. Unfortunately, the regression coefficient of the log of employees is 
not susceptible of a clean interpretation in terms of technological parameters.  
Most important, to trace out the effects of human capital, we include the years of schooling of 
the manager SE and the years of schooling of workers SW  in Table 8, and subsequently the average years 
of schooling in the region Si  in Tables 9 and 10.  As we explained in Section II, the Mincer model of the 
relationship between education and human capital implies that schooling should enter the specification 
in levels, rather than in logs.  Accordingly, the regression coefficients of the schooling variables should 
respectively capture parameters (1–α–β–δ) i E,  , α i W,   and γψ i   in Equation (21). To capture scale 
effects in regional externalities, in Tables 9 and 10 we control for the log of the region’s population Li.  
The regression coefficient on this variable should capture γ in Equation (21).  After presenting the basic 




Begin with the results in Table 8, which includes region-industry fixed effects (for 16 industries).   
In the (log) sales per employee specification, the coefficient on energy per employee is .34, while that on 
capital  per  employee  is  .30.    These  coefficients,  however,  are  closer  to  .3  in  the  value  added 
specification, and to .2 in the average wage specifications.  When both variables are included in the 
specification, their sum is higher.   Based on these estimates as well as on conventional calibration 
parameters (see Caselli 2005), we use .35 as capital share when we calibrate the model and assess its 
ability to account for variation in productivity across space.   
The  coefficient  on  worker  schooling  averages  to  about  .03  in  the  sales  per  employee 
specifications, roughly the same in the value added specifications, but is closer to .015 in the wage 
specifications.  The coefficient on management schooling is also about .03 in the sales per employee 
specification,  slightly  lower  in  the  valued  added  specification,  but  falls  to  about  .02  in  the  wage 
specification. The coefficient on the log employment (firm size) is about .1 across specifications.  The 
result that larger firms are more productive is at first glance inconsistent with the diminishing returns 
specification,  but  it  may  reflect  omitted  organization-specific  capital  or  other  sources  of  higher 
productivity in larger firms.   Firm size might also capture some of the effects of managerial education, 
since in our data larger firms are run by better educated managers (see also earlier results of Bloom and 
Van  Reenen  2007  and  La  Porta  and  Shleifer  2008  on  the  importance  of  managerial  education).  
Controlling for size may also help account for market power. 
In Table 9, we include country and industry fixed effects, but add regional years of education to 
the  regressions.    There  are  some  changes  in  parameter  estimates,  but  the  coefficients  on  worker 
education remain around .03, those on manager education likewise remain around .03, and capital 
shares stay around .35, like in the specifications of Table 8.   In addition, we find consistent evidence of 
large effects on productivity from regional factors.  The coefficient on regional schooling is amazingly 33 
 
consistent  and  statistically  significant  across  specifications,  and  varies  between  .05  and  .1.    The 
coefficient on regional population varies across specifications, but we will take it to be around .09 based 
on the results for sales per employee and value added per employee. 
In our analysis of determinants of regional productivity, geographic variables, but not measures 
of culture or institutions, have been consistently statistically significant.  Accordingly, in Table 10 we 
examine the robustness of the results in Table 9 by controlling for the geographic factors.  Such controls 
might also go some way toward enabling us to attribute the coefficient on regional human capital to 
externalities rather than omitted regional productivity factors.   The coefficients on geography variables 
are  quite  unstable  in  these  specifications,  with  inverse  distance  to  coast  exerting  a  large  positive 
influence on productivity in four specifications (but not the other eleven), and oil endowment exerting 
now a large negative effect in some specifications.  The most obvious  proxies for omitted regional 
productivity thus do not appear to be important.  Critically, the coefficients on years of education of 
managers and years of education of workers do not fall much relative to the specifications in Table 8, 
indicating that returns to education of entrepreneurs remain high even with regional controls. The 
coefficient on years of education in the region falls a bit in some specifications relative to its value in 
Table 9.   We will use the average estimate of .065 in our calculations. 
We added additional controls to these regressions, and obtained similar results.  This evidence 
needs to be explored further, but most of the specifications confirm both the general findings, and 
parameter estimates, computed from Tables 8 and 9.  There does not appear to be much evidence of 
significant omitted regional effects, although since we do not have a complete set of determinants of 
regional productivity, our assessment of external effects might be exaggerated. 
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Can the effects estimated from firm level regressions account for the large role of schooling in 
the regional regressions?  How do these effects compare with the work in development accounting?  
We  address  these  questions  by  starting  with  the  roles  of  managers’  and  workers’  schooling.  The 
coefficient on workers’ average schooling in the firm level regressions is about 0.03, which in our model 
implies α W  = 0.03.  The standard calibration for the U.S. labour share is about α = 0.6.  If however we 
calibrate α = 0.55 to capture the fact that in developing countries the labour share tends to be lower 
than in the U.S. (also because part of labour income goes to self employment, Gollin 2002), we obtain
W  = 0.55, which is in the ballpark of micro evidence on worker Mincerian returns (Psacharopoulos 
1994).  The fact that Mincerian returns to education implied by our empirical evidence are consistent 
with existing research suggests that our firm level productivity regressions help reduce identification 
problems, at least as far as firm-level variables are concerned.  
The regressions also point to an overall capital share (considering energy or equipment) roughly 
equal to 0.35.  In our model, this captures the income share δ + β going to K and T which leaves – under 
constant returns – a share of 0.1 going to entrepreneurial rents.  That is, (1–α–β–δ) = (1– 0.55– 0.35) = 
0.1.  Since the estimated coefficient on managerial education roughly implies (1–α–β–δ) E  = 0.03, our 
results are consistent with a Mincerian return  E   = .30 for entrepreneurs.   The 30% estimate is higher 
than those found by Goldin and Katz (2008) for returns to college education for workers, but lines up 
with  the  few  existing  analyses  of  entrepreneurial  education,  which  document  substantially  larger 
returns of education for managers than for workers (Parker and van Praag 2005, van Praag et al. 2009).
22  
                                                           
22  Using  U.S.  and  Dutch  individual-level  data,  these  studies  find  that  one  extra  year  of  schooling  increases 
entrepreneurial income by 18% and 14%, respectively.  This is much higher than the 3% found in our firm-level 
data (in our model entrepreneurial income is a constant share of a firm’s output), implying gigantic Mincerian 
returns under an entrepreneurial share of α = 0.1.  Note, however, that these studies rely on small start-ups (in the 
Dutch data) or on self employed individuals (in the U.S. data). In both cases, the entrepreneurial share is likely to 
be higher than 0.1, moving Mincerian returns closer to our benchmark of 30%. 35 
 
This  preliminary  assessment  suggests  that  a  neglected  but  critical  channel  through  which 
schooling and human capital affect productivity is via entrepreneurial inputs. Individuals selected into 
entrepreneurship appear to be vastly more talented than workers, driving up productivity.  Of course, 
entrepreneurial talent may be more important than entrepreneurial schooling in explaining this finding. 
Our analysis cannot adequately address this issue (which would require better data and an endogenous 
determination of the connection between schooling and talent).  Our analysis is, nevertheless, sufficient 
to identify a critical role of management and entrepreneurship in determining productivity.  
The large returns to entrepreneurial education,  compared to the  relatively small  returns to 
worker education, might explain the problem that the previous literature on development accounting 
has experienced with the Mincer regressions (Caselli 2005, Hsieh and Klenow 2010).  As we show below, 
spatial differences in the  stocks of human capital implied  only by returns to worker education are 
considerably lower than those implied by blended returns of workers and entrepreneurs.  Including 
entrepreneurial returns in the calculation thus substantially enhances the ability of human capital to 
account  for  differences  in  productivity  across  space.    Entrepreneurial  returns  might  be  ignored  in 
surveys focusing on wages as returns to education.   
We  can  use  the  estimates  of  Tables  9  and  10  to  assess  the  magnitude  of  human  capital 
externalities.  The coefficient on population in Table 9, roughly equal to 0.09, suggests that γ is also 
about 0.09.  Interestingly, this assessment is consistent with the regional regressions in Table 4.  In fact, 
the coefficient on population is positive and roughly equal to 0.01.  This implies that γ – β/(1 – δ) = 0.01 
in Equation (21).  Given that γ = 0.09 and β + δ = 0.35, this condition yields β to be roughly 0.06, which 
happens  to  be  in  the  ballpark  of  the  land  share  estimated  from  income  accounts  (Valentinyi  and 
Herrendorf 2008). In sum, β = 0.06, δ=0.29 and γ = 0.09 are roughly consistent with both firm level and 
regional regressions as well as with standard calibration exercises. 36 
 
The coefficient on regional schooling in the firm-level regressions of Table 9 is about .065.  This 
implies (given γ = 0.09) that ψ is about .72.  To separate the effect of the population-wide Mincerian 
return    from the strength of the externalities ψ, we exploit the regional regressions.  According to 
Equation (20) describing regional output, in these regressions the coefficient on schooling is equal to [1+ 
γψ –β/(1 – δ)] .  In Table 4, this coefficient is about 0.26.  Since we have already accepted γ = 0.09 and 
β/(1 – δ) = 0.08 as reasonable estimates, we are left with two equations with two unknowns, namely (1+ 
0.09ψ – 0.08) = 0.26 and ψ  = 0.72.  These equations imply an average population-wide Mincerian 
return    of about 0.21 (which is in between our estimates of workers’ and entrepreneurs’ values) and 
that the average education externality parameter ψ is about 3.45.  That is, a given increase in regional 
human capital generates 3.45 times more externalities if it is due to an increase in the average amount 
of human capital rather than to a higher number of people with average education.  These estimates 
point to a large effect of schooling for productivity via social interactions or R&D spillovers, consistent 
with Lucas (1985, 2008) as well as with the literature in urban economics cited in the introduction.  
Finally, note that at the above parameter values and at a reasonable share of housing consumption of θ= 
0.4, the spatial equilibrium is stable, since (β – ψγ)(1 – θ) + θ(1 – δ) = – (0.25)(0.6) + (0.4)(0.74)>0. 
We can now use our results to assess the magnitude of the effect of schooling.  Begin with the 
role  of  workers’  and  entrepreneurs’  inputs.  In  regional  regressions,  the  population-wide  Mincerian 
return of 0.21 is needed to make sense of the data, while the firm level regressions suggest that the 
Mincerian return is 6% for workers and 30% for entrepreneurs.  Although we lack direct data on the 
number of entrepreneurs in the economy, we can make a back-of-the-envelope calculation to assess 
whether our firm level evidence is consistent with a 21% Mincerian return population-wide.  If: (1) an 
average entrepreneur is as educated as the entrepreneurs in the enterprise survey on average, i.e. has 
14 years of schooling; and (2) an average worker in the economy is as educated as the average person in 37 
 
the sample, i.e. has roughly 7 years of schooling, then to obtain an average population-wise Mincerian 
return of 21% entrepreneurs need to account for only 4.8% of the workforce.
23  Our estimates thus 
suggest that private returns to schooling may be much larger than what previously thought due to the 
neglected role of entrepreneurial inputs. 
Consider next the role of externalities. Using our estimated parameters, raising the educational 
level from the sample mean of 6.58 years by one year can be calculated to increase regional TFP by 
about 6.7%.  Rauch (1993) estimates a comparable magnitude of 3-5%.  Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) 
estimate that a one year increase in average schooling is associated with a 7% increase in average 
wages.   Moretti (2004) examines the impact of spillovers associated with the share of college graduates 
living in a city.  If we run the regressions in Table 9 using the fraction of the population with college 
degrees instead of our measure of years of schooling, our estimates imply that a one percentage point 
increase in the share of region’s population with a college degree increases output per capita by 7.9%.  
Iranzo and Peri (2009) estimate that one extra year of college per worker increase the state’s TFP by a 
very  significant  6-9%,  whereas  the  effect  of  an  extra  year  of  high  school  is  closer  to  0-1%.      The 
agreement among the various estimates is quite striking. Even if we use the coefficients obtained in 
Table  10 when  controlling  for  factors  potentially  affecting  regional  productivity,  the  change  is  very 
modest, increasing the required population-wide Mincerian return  to .23 and reducing the externality 
parameter ψ to 2.4.  Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in the identification of externalities, their 
quantitative role seems to be quite robust. 
In sum, the firm level and regional productivity differences are mutually consistent because: i) 
entrepreneurial  education  is  much  more  important  than  workers’  education  in  accounting  for 
productivity across firms and regions, and ii) human capital externalities are also sizeable.  The standard 
                                                           
23The population-wise average Mincerian return is computed as the return   that solves the equation exp( [
7 ) 1 ( 14     f f ]) =  exp(0.3 14) (1 )exp(0.06 7) ff     where f is the fraction of entrepreneurs. 38 
 
development  accounting  literature  has  neglected  both  channels.    Since  our  estimation  of 
entrepreneurial returns is less subject to endogeneity problems than the estimation of externalities, we 
now assess the relative importance of these two channels in explaining cross-country differences in 
income per capita by using as a reference some well known results of macro development accounting 
exercises.  To do so, define a factor-based model of national income as 




is national income level predicted by our model when: i) all regions in a country are identical and all 
countries are equally productive, and ii) where – in line with standard development accounting - we 
consider only physical and human capital, thereby attributing land rents to physical capital (deducting 
these  rents  would  not  change  much).  This  simplified  model  with  no  regional  mobility  provides  a 
benchmark to assess the role of physical and human capital when productivity differences are absent. 
Following Caselli (2005), one measure of the success of the model in explaining cross-country 








where Y is observed GDP.  Using  Caselli’s dataset, the observed variance of (log) GDP per worker is 1.32.  
Ignoring human capital externalities (i.e., assuming ψ=γ=0) and using the standard 8% average Mincerian 
return on human capital for both workers and entrepreneurs (i.e., setting  =8%), the variance of log(  ̂) 
equals 0.76, i.e. physical and human capital explain 57% (0.76/1.32) of the observed variation in income 
per worker. This calculation reproduces the standard finding that, under standard Mincerian returns, a 
big chunk of the cross country income variation is accounted for by the productivity residual.   
To isolate the role of entrepreneurial capital, we compute     ̂ by assuming no human capital 
externalities  (i.e., ψ=γ=0) while still keeping  a population-wide Mincerian return of 21%, which is 
consistent with our firm-level estimates.   It is not surprising that average Mincerian returns of about 39 
 
20% greatly improve the explanatory power of human capital.  Indeed, under this assumption success 
rises to 83%.  This improvement is solely due to accounting for managerial schooling.  We note that this 
result is quite sensitive to our assumption of labour share of 55%.   If labour share were lower, the 
residual income share that we allocate to entrepreneurial rents would be correspondingly higher, which 
would then reduce our estimate of the returns to entrepreneurial education, and therefore of average 
Mincerian returns.   This reservation should be kept in mind in interpreting our results.     
Finally,  to  assess  the  incremental  explanatory  power  of  human  capital  externalities,  we 
compute   ̂ assuming our estimated values (i.e., ψ=3.45 and γ=0.09), while retaining the assumption that 
the average Mincerian return equals 21%.   Under these new assumptions, success rises to 99%. Of 
course, these results need to be interpreted cautiously since there is considerable uncertainty regarding 
the  true  values  of  the  underlying  coefficients.    In  particular,  a  sharply  lower  value  of  returns  to 
entrepreneurial schooling would reduce this measure of success (but would also be difficult to reconcile 
with our estimates).  Nevertheless, these calculations illustrate that entrepreneurial inputs play a much 
more important role than externalities in increasing the explanatory power of human capital.  
The comparison between Mozambique and the US illustrates the importance of entrepreneurial 
inputs to understand cross-country income differences.  Income per worker is roughly 33 times higher in 
the US than in Mozambique ($57,259 vs. $1,752), while the stock of physical capital is 185 times higher 
in the US than in Mozambique ($125,227 vs. $676).  The average number of years of schooling for the 
population 15 years and older is 1.01years Mozambique and 12.69 years in the United States.  These 
large  differences  in  schooling  imply  that  the  (per  capita)  stock  of  human  capital  is  11.6  higher 
(HUS/HMOZ=e
.21*(12.69-1.01))  in  the  US  than  in  Mozambique  if  the  average  Mincerian  return  is  21%.    In 
contrast, the (per capita) stock of human capital is only 2.5 times higher (HUS/HDRC=e
.08*(12.69-1.01)) in the US 
than in Mozambique if the average Mincerian return is 8%.   Using weights of 1/3 and 2/3 for physical 
and human capital, these differences in physical and human capital imply that income per worker should 40 
 
be 29 times higher in the US than in Mozambique (29=11.6
2/3x185
1/3), which is much closer to the actual  
value of 33 times than the 10.6 multiple implied by 8% Mincerian return (10.6=2.5
2/3x185
1/3).   
In sum, our firm level and regional regressions suggest that: i) in line with the development 
accounting literature, workers’ human capital is an important but not a large contributor to productivity 
differences,  ii)  entrepreneurial  inputs  area  fundamental  and  relatively  neglected  channel  for 
understanding  the  role  of  schooling  in  shaping  productivity  differences,  and  iii)  human  capital 
externalities  might  also  be  an  important  determinant  of  regional  productivity  differences.  Our 
parameter  estimates  point  to  very  large  returns  to  entrepreneurial  schooling  (perhaps  due  to 
entrepreneurs’ general talent) and to large social returns at the regional level arising from education. 
 
VI.  Conclusion. 
We have presented evidence from more than 1500 sub-national regions of the world on the 
determinants of regional income and labor productivity.   The evidence suggests that regional education 
is the critical determinant of regional development, and the only such determinant that explains a 
substantial share of regional variation.   Using data on several thousand firms located in these regions, 
we  have  also  found  that  regional  education  influences  regional  development  through  education  of 
workers, education of entrepreneurs, and regional externalities.  The latter come primarily from the 
level of education (the quality of human capital) in a region, and not from its total quantity (the number 
of people with some education).     
A simple Cobb-Douglas production function specification used in development accounting would 
have difficulty accounting for all this evidence.  Instead, we presented what we called a Lucas-Lucas 
model of an economy, which combines the allocation of talent between work and entrepreneurship, 
human capital externalities, and migration of labour across regions within a country.  Although many 
issues remain to be resolved, the empirical findings we presented are both consistent with the general 41 
 
predictions of this model, and provide plausible values for the model’s parameters.  In  addition, we 
follow Caselli (2005) in assessing the ability of the model to account for variation of output per worker 
across countries.   When we use our Lucas-Lucas model, we can roughly double the ability of the model 
to  account  for  cross-country  income  differences  relative  to  the  traditional  specification.    Our 
parameterization can explain 99% of income differences across countries.  
The  central  message  of  the  estimation/calibration  exercise  is  that,  while  private  returns  to 
worker education are modest and close to previous estimates, but private returns to entrepreneurial 
education  (in  the  form  of  profits)  and  possibly  also  social  returns  to  education  through  external 
spillovers, are large.  This evidence suggests that earlier estimates of return to education have perhaps 
underestimated  one  of  its  important  benefits  –  the  externalities,  and  largely  missed  the  other  – 
entrepreneurship.  This final observation has significant implications for economic development.  
Our  data  points  most  directly  to  the  role of  the  supply  of  educated  entrepreneurs  for  the 
creation and productivity of firms.  From the point of view of development accounting, having such 
entrepreneurs  seems  more  important  than  having  educated  workers.    Consistent  with  earlier 
observations of Banerjee and Duflo (2005) and La Porta and Shleifer (2008), economic development 
occurs  in  educated  regions  that  concentrate  entrepreneurs,  who  run  productive  firms.  These 
entrepreneurs, as well, appear to contribute to the exchange of ideas, leading so significant regional 
externalities.  The  observed  large  benefits  of  education  through  the  creation  of  a  supply  of 
entrepreneurs and through externalities offer an optimistic assessment of the possibilities of economic 
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Proof of Proposition 1 Due to A.1, labour moves from unproductive to productive regions. Formally, 
Equation (11) implies that an agent with human capital hj migrates if 
     B j B G j G H h w H h w / / ) (
1 1     , 
where φ captures migration costs. This identifies a human capital threshold hm such that agent j migrates 
if and only if hj ≥ hm. By exploiting the wage equation in (6) and the equilibrium condition (9), threshold 




































1  .                                                        (Ap.1) 
To pin down the equilibrium, note that the aggregate resource constraint is given by: 
p∙HG + (1 – p)∙HB  = H.                                                            (Ap.2) 
After accounting for externalities, the equilibrium condition (Ap.1) can be written as:  

































































h .                                   (Ap.3) 
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.                                                (Ap.5) 
Under full mobility (φ = 0), using (Ap.3) one finds that the equilibrium is determined by the condition: 49 
 
















































































































  .          (Ap.6) 
The left hand side is decreasing in HG.  If (β - ψγ)(1- θ) + θ(1- δ)> 0, the right hand side - which captures 
the cost of migrating to productive regions, increases in HG.  As a result, when (β - ψγ)(1- θ) + θ(1- δ)> 0 
even under full mobility in the stable equilibrium there is no universal migration to productive regions. 
Indeed, if all human capital moves to productive regions, then HG = H/p and the right hand side of 
(Ap.10) becomes infinite. Full migration is not an equilibrium. No migration is not an equilibrium either, 
as in this case A.1 implies that (Ap.10) cannot hold.  When ψ = 1 (and φ = 0) the equilibrium has: 
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When (β - ψγ)(1- θ) + θ(1- δ)> 0, an increase in HG (holding H constant) shifts down the left hand side 







we  approximate  GDP  using  data  on  income  (6  countries),  expenditure  (8  countries),  wages  (3 
















































information  available  for  the  period  1990‐2006.  To  make  levels  of  educational  attainment 























































estimated  oil  in  each  assessment  unit  was  allocated  to  the  regions  based  on  the  fraction  of 
assessment unit area covered by each region.  Off‐shore assessment units are not included. The 
World Petroleum Assessment map includes all oil fields in the world except those in the United States 



















































































category;  (5)  Substantial  limitations  on  executive  authority  (the  executive  has  more  effective 




























































































































































Ln(GDP per capita) 1,537 107 11 8.69 8.07 9.54 1.03 0.30 0.33
Years of Education 1,489 106 12 6.58 5.34 8.70 2.34 0.73 0.92
Temperature 1,568 110 12 16.84 10.23 21.13 4.47 1.45 0.09
Inverse Distance to Coast 1,569 110 12 0.90 0.80 0.99 0.13 0.05 0.05
Ln(Oil) 1,569 110 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Informal Payments 361 76 4 1.02 0.40 1.60 0.94 0.45 0.59
ln(Tax Days) 270 58 5 1.29 1.06 1.51 0.36 0.19 0.18
Ln(Days without electricity) 222 75 2 3.03 2.73 3.37 0.54 0.36 0.32
Security costs 373 79 4 0.91 0.39 1.34 0.72 0.34 0.42
Access to land 519 81 5 0.15 0.04 0.27 0.21 0.09 0.40
Access to finance 536 82 5 0.28 0.14 0.47 0.29 0.12 0.24
Government Predictability 386 75 4 0.46 0.34 0.61 0.24 0.10 0.20
Doing Business Percentile Rank 180 19 6 0.40 0.21 0.49 0.22 0.11 0.31
Ln(Power line density) 1,569 110 12 1.34 0.00 2.53 1.87 0.61 0.61
Ln(Travel time) 1,569 110 12 5.28 4.21 6.00 1.82 0.54 0.46
Trust in others 745 69 9 0.23 0.12 0.38 0.22 0.07 0.35
Civic Values 683 75 8 2.23 1.71 3.12 1.08 0.48 0.19
Ln(Number of ethnic groups) 1,568 110 12 0.98 0.00 1.79 1.39 0.50 0.46



















Ln(Establishments / Population) 984 65 12 ‐4.89 ‐5.45 ‐4.06 1.17 0.37 0.37
Ln(Employees / Establishments) 1,068 69 12 2.07 1.69 2.39 0.80 0.20 0.19
Ln(Employees / Population) 1,056 69 12 ‐2.66 ‐3.38 ‐1.80 1.58 0.43 0.41
Ln(Employees Big Firms / Employees) 540 31 13 ‐1.45 ‐2.17 ‐0.78 1.13 0.33 0.27
Ln(Sales / Employee) 549 82 5 10.21 9.79 10.59 0.79 0.35 1.22
Ln([Sales ‐ Raw Materials]/Employee) 359 70 4 9.53 9.24 9.87 0.69 0.37 1.21
Ln(Wages / Employee) 515 77 5 8.28 8.00 8.66 0.62 0.25 1.79
Ln(Employees) 549 82 5 3.25 2.72 3.71 0.82 0.35 1.46
Ln(Expenditure on energy / Employee) 326 66 4 6.10 5.51 6.36 0.60 0.30 1.22
Ln(Property, plant and equipment / Employee) 205 41 4 8.72 8.37 9.37 0.99 0.47 1.26
Years of Education of Workers 507 74 5 9.97 8.66 10.80 2.25 0.93 3.06







Years of Education 1,470 104 38% 58%
Temperature 1,536 107 1% 27%
Inverse Distance to Coast 1,537 107 4% 13%
Ln(Oil) 1,537 107 2% 4%
Informal Payments 350 74 0% 21%
ln(Tax Days) 263 56 0% 20%
Ln(Days without electricity) 219 73 2% 6%
Security costs 362 77 0% 7%
Access to land 507 79 0% 15%
Access to finance 524 80 1% 8%
Government Predictability 380 73 1% 0%
Doing Business Percentile Rank 176 18 2% 13%
Ln(Power line density) 1,537 107 5% 36%
Ln(Travel time) 1,537 107 7% 15%
Trust in others 739 68 0% 18%
Ln(Number of ethnic groups) 1,536 107 5% 17%





































Observations 107 104 103
Adjusted R









































Observations 1,545 1,478 833
Number of countries 107 104 49
R
2  Within 8% 42% 50%
R
2  Between 47% 60% 70%
R
2  Overall 34% 62% 70%
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Panel B:  Dependent Variable is Logarithm Regional GDP per capita
Table 4:  GDP per capita and Geography (continued)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Years of Education 0.2566a 0.2310a 0.1890a 0.2339a 0.2291a 0.2301a 0.2264a 0.2355a 0.1749b
(0.0308) (0.0344) (0.0310) (0.0316) (0.0336) (0.0350) (0.0344) (0.0332) (0.0703)
Ln(Population) 0.0684
c ‐0.0022 0.0887 0.0428 0.0320 0.0067 0.0299 0.0611 ‐0.0782
(0.0408) (0.0494) (0.0582) (0.0488) (0.0481) (0.0519) (0.0473) (0.0457) (0.1074)
Temperature ‐0.0189
c ‐0.0105 ‐0.0276
b ‐0.0083 ‐0.0094 ‐0.0066 ‐0.0082 ‐0.0129 ‐0.0147















































(0.9372) (1.1015) (1.2918) (0.9542) (1.0046) (0.9971) (1.0246) (0.9724) (3.1636)
Observations 104 73 55 75 76 80 81 72 17
Adjusted R
2 63% 73% 76% 69% 69% 70% 70% 71% 34%
Adj. R
2  without institution 63% 73% 69% 69% 69% 69% 69% 71% 39%
Adj. R


















(0.0308) (0.0338) (0.0325) (0.0498) (0.0538) (0.0347) (0.0377)
Ln(Population) 0.0684
c 0.0688
c 0.0653 0.1238 0.2169
b 0.0999 0.0807
c









































b 2.3962 ‐0.1572 3.4625
a 3.3864
a
(0.9372) (0.9251) (1.2448) (2.0122) (3.2084) (0.9289) (0.9548)
Observations 104 104 104 67 57 104 103
Adjusted R
2 63% 63% 63% 49% 47% 63% 62%
Adj. R
2  without infrastructure or culture 63% 63% 63% 48% 45% 63% 62%
Adj. R
2 without education 50% 54% 50% 44% 42% 51% 52%
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Table 5:  National GDP per capita, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture (cont)











(0.0172) (0.0298) (0.0288) (0.0481) (0.0310) (0.0218) (0.0215) (0.0207) (0.0229)
Ln(Population in the Region) 0.0126 ‐0.0185 ‐0.0175 ‐0.0442 ‐0.0191 ‐0.0087 ‐0.0098 ‐0.0113 ‐0.0026
(0.0168) (0.0495) (0.0536) (0.0613) (0.0432) (0.0316) (0.0312) (0.0305) (0.0229)
Temperature ‐0.0140
c ‐0.0101 ‐0.0086 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0064 ‐0.0093 ‐0.0106 ‐0.0131 0.0016
(0.0084) (0.0096) (0.0078) (0.0122) (0.0093) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0081) (0.0059)
Inverse Distance to Coast 0.4971
a 0.4647 0.8290
c 0.1810 0.2703 0.4054 0.5133
c 0.4420 0.0913
(0.1441) (0.3293) (0.4273) (0.4312) (0.3041) (0.2636) (0.2822) (0.2788) (0.3460)
Ln(Oil) 0.1752
a ‐0.0578 0.1555 ‐0.0584 ‐0.0473 ‐0.0224 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0170 0.1834




























(0.1947) (0.7043) (0.8220) (0.7867) (0.5993) (0.4664) (0.4827) (0.4629) (0.4428)
Observations 1,469 338 255 216 352 387 381 368 172
Number of countries 104 73 55 72 76 77 76 72 17
R
2  Within 42% 58% 66% 59% 60% 62% 62% 63% 69%
R
2  Between 60% 64% 64% 53% 58% 60% 60% 63% 39%
R
2  Overall 62% 59% 60% 49% 53% 55% 55% 56% 51%
Within R
2  without institution 42% 57% 66% 59% 60% 62% 62% 62% 67%
Within R
2  without education 9% 11% 14% 10% 9% 6% 5% 7% 9%
Between R
2  without institution 60% 64% 63% 53% 58% 60% 60% 63% 41%
Between R
2  without education 42% 25% 20% 21% 26% 35% 39% 45% 50%


















(0.0172) (0.0187) (0.0197) (0.0286) (0.0305) (0.0181) (0.0175)
Ln(Population in the Region) 0.0126 0.0101 0.0023 0.0091 0.0138 0.0170 0.0115




c ‐0.0015 ‐0.0038 ‐0.0154
c ‐0.0140
c












a 0.0534 0.0354 0.1922
a 0.1772
a























(0.1947) (0.1928) (0.3351) (0.2863) (0.3245) (0.1679) (0.2337)
Observations 1,469 1,469 1,469 699 635 1,468 1,445
Number of countries 104 104 104 65 70 104 103
R
2  Within 42% 42% 43% 49% 48% 42% 42%
R
2  Between 60% 60% 60% 50% 50% 60% 60%
R
2  Overall 62% 62% 61% 50% 47% 62% 62%
Within R
2  without institution 42% 42% 42% 49% 48% 42% 42%
Within R
2  without education 9% 13% 17% 10% 10% 14% 11%
Between R
2  without institution 60% 60% 60% 51% 50% 60% 59%
Between R
2  without education 42% 51% 47% 7% 17% 47% 50%
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Table 6: Regional GDP per capita, Institutions, Infrastructure, and Culture (Cont)








(0.0308) (0.0433) (0.0438) (0.0480) (0.0363) (0.0351)
Ln(Population) 0.0683
c 0.0354 0.0559 ‐0.0356 0.0732 0.0504
(0.0410) (0.0487) (0.0470) (0.0482) (0.0533) (0.0370)
Temperature ‐0.0189
c ‐0.0179 ‐0.0135 0.0024 ‐0.0181 ‐0.0100







































(0.9416) (1.3861) (1.0059) (1.3630) (1.0503) (0.8118)
Observations 103 80 101 81 97 103
Adjusted R
2 63% 67% 65% 70% 63% 69%
Adj. R
2  without institution 63% 64% 63% 63% 62% 63%
Adj. R






























































(0.0095) (0.0094) . . (0.0118) (0.0102) (0.0101) . . (0.0117) (0.0086) (0.0086) . . (0.0102)



























(0.0673) (0.0660) (0.0556) (0.0564) (0.0889) (0.0682) (0.0674) (0.0564) (0.0574) (0.0863) (0.0595) (0.0604) (0.0487) (0.0500) (0.0784)
Observations 13,248 13,248 19,305 19,305 7,733 10,651 10,651 17,893 17,893 6,655 12,782 12,782 19,209 19,209 7,706
Number of Regions‐Industries 855 855 1,037 1,037 487 754 754 1,005 1,005 458 807 807 1,033 1,033 486
Within R
2  21% 23% 21% 21% 30% 20% 22% 20% 20% 29% 13% 14% 8% 8% 17%
Between R
2  90% 89% 67% 67% 88% 28% 24% 55% 54% 51% 89% 88% 66% 67% 86%
Overall R
2  79% 78% 58% 58% 81% 37% 33% 59% 58% 53% 76% 74% 57% 59% 78%




































a 0.0682 0.0622 0.0135 0.0159 0.0787
c
















(0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0062) (0.0057) (0.0077) (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0052)
Ln(Employees) . 0.1497





a . ‐0.0095 0.0717
a















(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0056) (0.0058) (0.0068) (0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0051)
Ln(Expenditure on energy / employee) 0.3577
a 0.3554
a . . 0.2902
a 0.3183
a 0.3133
a . . 0.2440
a 0.2248
a 0.2232
a . . 0.1721
a
(0.0185) (0.0177) . . (0.0220) (0.0182) (0.0175) . . (0.0202) (0.0173) (0.0172) . . (0.0168)
Ln(Property, Plant, Equipment / employees) . . 0.3258
a 0.3250
a 0.1946
a . . 0.3150
a 0.3118
a 0.1818





















(0.3706) (0.3373) (1.1885) (1.1887) (0.4521) (0.4183) (0.4008) (0.8173) (0.8009) (0.6479) (0.5225) (0.5199) (0.7223) (0.7248) (0.7073)
Observations 13,248 13,248 19,305 19,305 7,733 10,651 10,651 17,893 17,893 6,655 12,782 12,782 19,209 19,209 7,706
Number of Countries 29 29 22 22 21 25 25 21 21 20 27 27 22 22 21
Within R
2  30% 32% 31% 31% 37% 28% 30% 27% 28% 36% 20% 21% 13% 13% 22%
Between R
2  90% 90% 59% 59% 92% 87% 86% 70% 71% 89% 88% 87% 57% 57% 89%
Overall R
2  74% 74% 54% 54% 80% 74% 72% 73% 73% 81% 69% 68% 44% 44% 76%
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note:  a = significant at the 1% level, b = significant at the 5% level, and c = significant at the 10% level. 
Table 9:  Firm level productivity and Regional Human Capital
The table reports fixed effect regressions for for the following two dependent variables: (1) logarithm of sales per employee, (2) logarithm of sales net of raw materials per employee, and (3) logarithm of wages per employee.   All regressions include country and 
industry fixed effects.  Errors are clustered at the regional level.  The independent variables include:  (1) Years of Education in the Region,  (2) Ln(Population in the Region), (3) Years of Education of manager, (4) Ln(Employees), (5) Years of Education of 
workers, (6) Ln(Expenditure on energy / employee), and (7) Ln(Property, Plant, Equipment / employees). All variables are described in Table 1.  
Ln[(Sales ‐ Raw Materials)/Employee] Logarithm of Wages per employee Ln(Sales/Employee)
Dependent Variable:(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Temperature 0.0084 0.0105 0.0081 0.0082 0.0190 ‐0.0217 ‐0.0200 ‐0.0023 ‐0.0021 0.0278 ‐0.0141 ‐0.0128 0.0113
b 0.0112
b ‐0.0046
(0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0150) (0.0171) (0.0155) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0232) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0100)
Inverse Distance to Coast 0.3464 0.2275 1.1491
a 1.1458
a 0.6196 ‐0.2990 ‐0.4531 1.0464
a 1.0125
a ‐0.1930 ‐0.0127 ‐0.0841 0.2830 0.2947 0.1021
(0.3708) (0.3652) (0.2065) (0.2079) (0.4041) (0.4233) (0.3851) (0.2286) (0.2228) (0.5291) (0.3349) (0.3369) (0.1824) (0.1824) (0.3564)
Ln(Oil) ‐0.8681
a ‐0.6813
b 0.1682 0.1728 ‐1.2953
c ‐0.7747
a ‐0.5679
c ‐0.0945 ‐0.0492 ‐0.6443 ‐0.6755
c ‐0.5721 0.1596 0.1433 ‐1.2264
b
(0.2856) (0.3124) (0.5944) (0.5919) (0.7382) (0.2878) (0.3084) (0.4935) (0.4942) (0.8883) (0.3430) (0.3619) (0.3833) (0.3804) (0.4702)
Years of Education in the Region 0.0532
a 0.0558
a 0.0236 0.0236 0.0287
c 0.0800
a 0.0839















a 0.0493 0.0418 0.1195
a 0.0706
c 0.0629 ‐0.0257 ‐0.0230 0.0852
c
















(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0053) (0.0077) (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0059) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0052)
Ln(Employees) . 0.1486





a . ‐0.0125 0.0719
a


























(0.0184) (0.0176) . . (0.0220) (0.0183) (0.0176) . . (0.0204) (0.0174) (0.0172) . . (0.0168)



























(0.4348) (0.3958) (0.9995) (1.0016) (0.5013) (0.8349) (0.7626) (0.6071) (0.6003) (0.9306) (0.7249) (0.7132) (0.6127) (0.6112) (0.7689)
Observations 13,248 13,248 19,305 19,305 7,733 10,651 10,651 17,893 17,893 6,655 12,782 12,782 19,209 19,209 7,706
(0.2856) (0.3124) (0.5944) (0.5919) (0.7382) (0.2878) (0.3084) (0.4935) (0.4942) (0.8883) (0.3430) (0.3619) (0.3833) (0.3804) (0.4702)
Years of Education in the Region 0.0532
a 0.0558
a 0.0236 0.0236 0.0287
c 0.0800
a 0.0839















a 0.0493 0.0418 0.1195
a 0.0706
c 0.0629 ‐0.0257 ‐0.0230 0.0852
c





The table reports fixed effect regressions for for the following two dependent variables: (1) logarithm of sales per employee, (2) logarithm of sales net of raw materials per employee, and (3) logarithm of wages per employee.   All regressions include country and industry fixed 
effects.  Errors are clustered at the regional level.  The independent variables include:  (1) Temperature, (2) Inverse Distance to Coast, (3) Ln(Oil), (4) Years of Education in the Region,  (5) Ln(Population in the Region), (6) Years of Education of manager, (7) Ln(Employees), 
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Goiás Minas Gerais Mato Grosso do Sul
Amapá
Espírito Santo Paraná
Santa Catarina Rio Grande do Sul
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e( HKij | X )
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e( HKij | X )
coef = .23096736, (robust) se = .04695696, t = 4.92
Colombia
Bihar
Orissa Jharkhand Chattisgarh Rajasthan






Tripura Sikkim Nagaland Karnataka
Gujarat
Jammu & Kashmir
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e( HKij | X )










Kursk Region Chita Region Tambov Region Altai Republic Pskov region Bryansk Region
Kemerovo Region
Vologda Region
The Republic of Mari El
Lipetsk Region
Kostroma region




Ryazan Region Tver Region
Penza Region
Republic of Ingushetia
Sverdlovsk Region Amur Region
Komi Republic
Smolensk Region Vladimir Region Ulyanovsk Region Republic of Mordovia
Yaroslavl Region Chelyabinsk region
Tuva Republic
Republic of Khakassia Tula Region















Saratov Region Volgograd Region
Republic of Kalmykia






Samara Region Khabarovsk Krai
Tyumen Region
Kabardino-Balkar Republic
The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)
Kaliningrad Oblast
Magadan Region
Republic of North Ossetia - Alania



























-1 0 1 2
e( HKij | X )
coef = .54581172, (robust) se = .12771885, t = 4.27
Russian Federation



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































-4 -2 0 2 4
Years of Education
coef = .28573483, (robust) se = .01343762, t = 21.26Code Country Type of Data Source Available link
ALB Albania GDP Data from HDR 2002
ARE United Arab Emirates GDP Data from HDR 1997 in arabic
ARG Argentina GDP 1990‐2001 Data from Ministry of interior http://www.ec.gba.gov.ar/Estadistica/FTP/pbg/pbg3.html
ARM Armenia Expenditure National Statistics Office http://www.armstat.am/file/article/marz_07_e_22.pdf
AUS Australia GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
AUT Austria GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
AZE Azerbaijan Income National Statistics Office http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/budget_h
ouseholds/en/003.shtml
BEL Belgium GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
BEN Benin GDP Data from HDR 2007/2008 and 2003
BFA Burkina Faso GDP Data from HDR for GDP per capita.
BGD Bangladesh NA
BGR Bulgaria GDP Data from HDR 2003, 2002 and 2001
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina GDP National Statistics Offices http://www.bhas.ba/Arhiva/2007/brcko/PODACI%201‐08.pdf
BLZ Belize Expenditure Data from LSMS 2002 http://www.statisticsbelize.org.bz/dms20uc/dm_filedetails.asp?action=d&did=1
3
BOL Bolivia GDP National Statistics Office http://www.ine.gov.bo/indice/visualizador.aspx?ah=PC0104010201.HTM
BRA Brazil GDP National Statistics Office http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/economia/contasregionais/2002_2005
/contasregionais2002 2005.pdf
CAN Canada GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
CHE Switzerland GDP National Statistics Office http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/fr/index/infothek/lexikon/bienvenue___log
in/blank/zugang lexikon.Document.20896.xls
CHL Chile GDP National Statistics Office http://www.bcentral.cl/publicaciones/estadisticas/actividad‐economica‐
gasto/aeg07a.htm
CHN China GDP Data from National Statistics Yearbooks 2006, 2002, 1998 and 1996 http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1998e/C3‐8E.htm




COL Colombia GDP National Statistics Office http://www.dane.gov.co/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectio
nid=33&id=148&Itemid=705
CRI Costa Rica NA
CUB Cuba Wages Monthly wages from HDR 1996
CZE Czech Republic GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
DEU Germany GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
DNK Denmark GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
DOM Dominican Republic GDP National Statistics Office
ECU Ecuador GDP National Statistics Office
EGY Egypt GDP Data from HDRs 2008, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2001; data from 2006 excluded
ESP Spain GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx





FIN Finland GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
FRA France GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
GAB Gabon Expenditure Data from HDR 2005
GBR United Kingdom GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
GEO Georgia GDP Data from HDR 2002. http://www.undp.org.ge/nhdr2001‐02/chpt1.htm
GHA Ghana Income Data from Living Standards Measurement Survey Reports for 1998/9 and 1991/2 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLSMS/Resources/3358986‐
1181743055198/3877319‐1190221709991/G3report.pdf
GRC Greece GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
GTM Guatemala GDP Data from HDR 2007/2008 annex http://cms.fideck.com/userfiles/desarrollohumano.org/File/8012264236003654.
pdf
HND Honduras GDP Data from HDR 2006
HRV Croatia GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://www.dzs.hr/default_e.htm
HUN Hungary GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
IDN Indonesia GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://www.bps.go.id/sector/nra/grdp/table1.shtml
IND India GDP National Statistics Office http://mospi.nic.in/6_gsdp_cur_9394ser.htm
IRL Ireland GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
IRN Iran GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://www.sci.org.ir/content/userfiles/_sci_en/sci_en/sel/year85/f21/CS_21_4.
HTM
ISR Israel GDP National Statistics Office
ITA Italy GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
JOR Jordan GDP Data from HDR 2004
JPN Japan GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
KAZ Kazakhstan Income LSMS 1996, World Bank http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLSMS/Resources/3358986‐
1181743055198/3877319‐1181930718899/finrep1.pdf
KEN Kenya GDP Data from HDRs for 2006, 2005, 2003, 2001 and 1999
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic GDP Data from HDR 2005, 2001
APPENDIX OF DATA SOURCES:  REGIONAL GDPCode Country Type of Data Source Available link
KHM Cambodia Expenditure Data from Poverty profile of Cambodia 2004; Daily consumption  http://www.mop.gov.kh/Situationandpolicyanalysis/PovertyProfile/tabid/191/D
efault.aspx
KOR Korea, Rep. GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
LAO Lao PDR C+I+G Data from HDR 2006; Consumption, Investment and Government Expenditure
LBN Lebanon GDP Data from HDR 2001
LKA Sri Lanka GDP Data from HDR 1998 and National Statistics Office http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/pics_n_docs/08_statistics/_docs/xls_real_sector/table1.1
7.xls
LSO Lesotho GDP Data from HDR 2006
LTU Lithuania GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?MainTable=M2010210&
PLanguage=1&PXSId=0&ShowNews=OFF





MAR Morocco GDP + Expenditure Data from HDR 1999, 2003 and Enquete Nationale sur la Consommation et les Depenses des Menages 2000/2001
MDA Moldova Wages Data from 2007 Statistical Yearbook; monthly salary http://www.statistica.md/public/files/Yearbook/Venit_pop_1999_2006_en.doc
MDG Madagascar GDP Data from HDR 2003, 2000
MEX Mexico GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
MKD Macedonia, FYR GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://www.stat.gov.mk/english/statistiki_eng.asp?ss=09.01&rbs=2
MNG Mongolia GDP National Statistics Office
MOZ Mozambique GDP Data from HDR 2007, 2001
MWI Malawi Expenditure Data from Malawi INTEGRATED HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 2004‐2005 and 1998
MYS Malaysia GDP Data from Chapter 5 of EIGHTH MALAYSIA PLAN 2001 ‐ 2005 http://www.epu.jpm.my/new%20folder/development%20plan/RM8.htm
NAM Namibia Expenditure Data from Namibia Household Income & Expenditure Survey 2003/2004; data is expendituhttp://www.npc.gov.na/publications/prenhies03_04.pdf
NER Niger GDP Data from HDR 2004
NGA Nigeria Income 2006 Annual Abstract of Statistics.  http://nigerianstat.gov.ng/annual_report.htm
NIC Nicaragua Expenditure Data from HDR 2002
NLD Netherlands GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
NOR Norway GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
NPL Nepal GDP Data from HDR 2004, 2001 and 1998
NZL New Zealand GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
PAK Pakistan GDP Data from HDR 2003
PAN Panama GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://www.contraloria.gob.pa/dec/
PER Peru GDP Cuentas Nacionales del Peru, Producto Bruto Interno por Departmentos 2001‐2006 http://www1.inei.gob.pe/biblioineipub/bancopub/est/lib0763/cuadros/c037.xls
PHL Philippines GDP National Statistics Office
POL Poland GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
PRT Portugal GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
PRY Paraguay GDP Data from Atlas de Desarrollo Humano Paraguay 2007 http://www.undp.org.py/dh/?page=atlas
ROM Romania GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/pdf/en/cp11.pdf




SEN Senegal GDP Data from HDR 2001
SLV El Salvador GDP Data from HDR 2007/2008, 2005, 2003, 2001; 1996 values were in 1994 prices
SRB Serbia Income Data from National Statistics Municipal Database http://www.statserb.sr.gov.yu/Pod/epok.asp
SVK Slovak Republic GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
SVN Slovenia GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://www.stat.si/eng/novica_prikazi.aspx?id=1318
SWE Sweden GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
SWZ Swaziland GDP Data from HDR 2008
SYR Syrian Arab Republic GDP Data from HDR 2005
THA Thailand GDP Data from Statistical Year Book Thailand 2002 http://web.nso.go.th/eng/en/pub/pub0.htm
TUR Turkey GDP National Statistics Office http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=56&ust_id=16
TZA Tanzania GDP National Statistics Office
UGA Uganda GDP Data from HDR 2007
UKR Ukraine GDP Data from National Statistics Office http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/operativ/operativ2008/vvp/vrp/vrp2008_e.htm
URY Uruguay GDP Data from HDR 2005
USA United States GDP Data from OECDStats http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx
UZB Uzbekistan GDP Data from HDR 2007/8, 2000 and 1998
VEN Venezuela GDP Data from HDR 2000
VNM Vietnam Wages National Statistics Office http://www.gso.gov.vn/Modules/Doc_Download.aspx?DocID=2097
ZAF South Africa GDP National Statistics Office  (table 16) http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/statsdownload.asp?PPN=P0441&SCH=40
48
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. GDP Data from HDR 2008
ZMB Zambia GDP Data from HDR 2007 and 2003
ZWE Zimbabwe GDP Data fom HDR 2003Code Country Source Available Link
ALB Albania NA
ARE United Arab Emirates Ministry of Economy, 2005 Census http://www.economy.ae/English/economicandstatisticreports/statisticreports/pages/census2005.aspx
ARG Argentina Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ARM Armenia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
AUS Australia National Statistics Office http://www.abs.gov.au/ 
AUT Austria Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
AZE Azerbaijan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BEL Belgium Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
BEN Benin Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BFA Burkina Faso Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BGD Bangladesh Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BGR Bulgaria Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BLZ Belize Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BOL Bolivia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
BRA Brazil Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
CAN Canada National Statistics Office http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/l01/cst01/educ43a‐eng.htm
CHE Switzerland Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) SFSO http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/15/04/ind4.informations.40101.401.html
CHL Chile National Statistics Office http://espino.ine.cl/CuadrosCensales/apli_excel.asp
CHN China National Statistics Office http://www.stats.gov.cn/ndsj/information/nj97/C091A.END
CMR Cameroon Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
COL Colombia National Statistics Office http://190.25.231.246:8080/Dane/tree.jsf
CRI Costa Rica Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
CUB Cuba NA
CZE Czech Republic Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
DEU Germany Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
DNK Denmark National Statistics Office http://www.statbank.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/Define.asp?Maintable=RASU1&PLanguage=1
DOM Dominican Republic Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ECU Ecuador National Statistics Office http://190.95.171.13/cgibin/RpWebEngine.exe/PortalAction?&MODE=MAIN&BASE=ECUADOR21&MAIN=WebServerMain.inl
EGY Egypt Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/




C+NATIONALITY*&path=../I Databas/Population census/06Economically active population/ۃ=1
FIN Finland Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
FRA France Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
GAB Gabon Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
GBR United Kingdom Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
GEO Georgia National Statistics Office (special request of data)
GHA Ghana Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
GRC Greece Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
GTM Guatemala Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
HND Honduras Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
HRV Croatia National Statistics Office http://www.dzs.hr/Eng/censuses/Census2001/Popis/E01_01_07/E01_01_07.html
HUN Hungary Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
IDN Indonesia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
IND India Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
IRL Ireland Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
IRN Iran NA
ISR Israel Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
ITA Italy Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
JOR Jordan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
JPN Japan National Statistics Office http://www.e‐stat.go.jp/SG1/chiiki/ToukeiDataSelectDispatchAction.do
KAZ Kazakhstan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
KEN Kenya Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
KHM Cambodia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
KOR Korea, Rep. NA
LAO Lao PDR Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
LBN Lebanon Ministry of Social Affairs http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/PDFs/Educational%20status‐2004.pdf
LKA Sri Lanka Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
APPENDIX OF DATA SOURCES:  REGIONAL YEARS OF EDUCATIONCode Country Source Available Link







MAR Morocco Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MDA Moldova Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MDG Madagascar Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MEX Mexico Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MKD Macedonia, FYR Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MNG Mongolia Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
MOZ Mozambique Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MWI Malawi Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
MYS Malaysia Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 
NAM Namibia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NER Niger Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NGA Nigeria Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NIC Nicaragua Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/




NPL Nepal Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
NZL New Zealand National Statistics Office http://wdmzpub01.stats.govt.nz/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx
PAK Pakistan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
PAN Panama Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
PER Peru Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
PHL Philippines Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
POL Poland Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
PRT Portugal Eurostat http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/NavTree_prod/everybody/BulkDownloadListing 
PRY Paraguay National Statistics Office http://celade.cepal.org/cgibin/RpWebEngine.exe/EasyCross?&BASE=CPVPRY2002&ITEM=INDICADO&MAIN=WebServerMain.inl




SEN Senegal Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
SLV El Salvador VI Censo de la Poblacion y V de Vivienda 2007 http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/cgibin/RpWebEngine.exe/Crosstabs 
SRB Serbia National Statistics Office http://webrzs.statserb.sr.gov.yu/axd/en/Zip/CensusBook4.zip
SVK Slovak Republic National Statistics Office http://px‐web.statistics.sk/PXWebSlovak/DATABASE/En/02EmploMarket/01EconPopActiv/EA_total.px






SWZ Swaziland Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
SYR Syrian Arab Republic Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
THA Thailand Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
TUR Turkey National Statistics Office http://www.tuik.gov.tr/isgucueng/Kurumsal.do
TZA Tanzania Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
UGA Uganda Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
UKR Ukraine National Statistics Office http://stat6.stat.lviv.ua/PXWEB2007/Database/POPULATION/1/06/06.asp
URY Uruguay National Statistics Office http://www.ine.gub.uy/microdatos/engih2006/persona.zip,
USA United States National Statistics Office http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/DatasetMainPageServlet?_program=ACS&_submenuId=&_lang=en&_ts=
UZB Uzbekistan Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
VEN Venezuela Integrated Public Use Microdata Series International  (IPUMS) https://international.ipums.org/international/ 






ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ZMB Zambia Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/
ZWE Zimbabwe Education Policy and Data Center (EPDC) http://epdc.org/